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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Macroeconomics
by
Mat´ıas Vieyra
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Ariel Toma´s Burstein, Chair
This dissertation presents three contributions to the field of macroeconomics.
In the first chapter, I study the redistributive effects of monetary policy generated by
differences in expenditure choices over goods. I show that necessities, which feature low
expenditure elasticities, and are therefore consumed relatively more by low-expenditure
households, have a higher frequency of price adjustments relative to luxuries. I develop
a multisector monetary model with incomplete markets to quantify the effects of monetary
shocks on consumption for households with different levels of labor income and financial
wealth. The model can replicate the allocation of expenditure over goods observed in the
US. Following an expansionary monetary shock, I find that households that are borrowing-
constrained and have low labor income face inflation rates higher than the aggregate, and
therefore increase their consumption less than the increase predicted by a model that doesn’t
account for expenditure heterogeneity.
The second chapter, joint with Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, and Jeremy Majerovitz,
presents five facts on the behavior of U.S. banks between 2007 and 2015 that impose useful
restrictions on the formulation of a bank problem. (1) Market to book leverage ratio diverged
significantly during the crisis. (2) Book values appear to be backward looking. There is more
information content about future bank profitability and loan losses in market values than
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in book values. (3) Neither market nor regulatory constraints are strictly binding for most
banks. (4) Banks operate with a target market leverage ratio. (5) The adjustment behavior
back to the target changed fundamentally after the crisis.
In the third chapter, also joint with Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, and Jeremy Majerowitz,
we present ongoing work on a model that rationalizes the five facts described earlier. The
goal is to produce a reduced-form partial equilibrium model that illustrates the main features
that a quantitative general equilibrium model would need to match these facts. We develop
an heterogeneous-bank model that rationalizes these facts and can serve as a building block
for future work. An estimated version of the model successfully replicates the behaviour of
market leverage and liabilites observed before and after the Great Recession.
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CHAPTER 1
The Expenditure Channel of Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
Recent papers in monetary economics have turned their attention to the heterogeneous
responses across agents to monetary policy. Differences in consumption plans and portfolio
choices (Auclert (2017); Coibion et al. (2017); Wong (2016)) expose agents to monetary
shocks that change the relative price of consumption over time or the valuations of assets.
Understanding the mechanisms through which monetary policy impacts real variables is
important in order to inform policy and derive robust out-of-sample predictions. Moreover,
a detailed specification of these mechanisms grounded on disaggregated empirical evidence
allows us to quantify the welfare implications of monetary policy.
In this paper I provide a new channel through which heterogeneity matters for the effects
of monetary policy: poorer households buy relatively more of goods whose prices adjust more
frequently. I build on the applied literature of demand estimation to isolate the relationship
between expenditure choices across goods and a household’s level of expenditure. This helps
control for demographic variables or heterogeneity of preferences. Using the estimated pa-
rameters of the demand system I find a negative correlation between expenditure elasticities
for nondurable goods and services and the frequency with which prices adjust, as measured
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
Motivated by this finding, I quantify the effects of a monetary shock on consumption at
the household level through the lens of a model that incorporates these two characteristics
of goods. I build a model of heterogeneous consumers that face borrowing constraints and
have preferences over goods that feature nonhomotheticity. These preferences generate a
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relationship between a household’s income and wealth and her expenditure choices over
goods, allowing expenditure shares to vary over the distribution. The incompleteness of
financial markets has been recently emphasized by Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) as a
feature necessary to bridge the gap between predictions of standard monetary models for
marginal propensities to consume and observed counterparts. On the supply side, I assume
that firms must pay an adjustment cost in order to adjust their prices, and these nominal
frictions generate heterogeneity in the responses of prices to monetary shocks.
My model predicts that, following a 0.25 percentage points expansionary monetary shock,
households with low labor income and wealth experience an accummulated increase in their
consumption of 0.02 percentage points less than in a model that doesn’t account for expen-
diture heterogeneity. This response can be decomposed as coming from two forces. First,
these households face a higher inflation rate than the aggregate, because they buy relatively
more of goods whose inflation rate is more responsive to the monetary shock, and therefore
higher. Second, because of the borrowing constraint, they are unable to borrow in order to
smooth consumption over time.
Other studies have docummented the redistributive effects of monetary policy coming
from different expenditure choices. Cravino, Lan, and Levchenko (2018) compute price
indices along the distribution of income and find that households in the middle of the dis-
tribution tend to buy relatively more of goods whose prices adjust more frequently, whereas
households at the top and bottom deciles buy goods of relatively similar rigidity. My results
differ from theirs in that, instead of computing the unconditional shares of expenditure, I
estimate a demand system and use a model that generates the same predicted shares. This
has the advantage of been able to focus exclusively on the heterogeneity of expenditure com-
ing from expenditure levels, as oposed to other confounding factors that can be influencing
expenditure choices, such as age, family size, race, genre, number of children or homeown-
ership. My estimates reveal a negative correlation between the average frequency of price
adjustments and the level of expenditure of a household, with poorer households buying
more flexibly priced goods. The main category explaining the difference between my result
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and theirs is motor fuel, which they find is bought predominantly more by middle-income
households, whereas I estimate to be a necessity. My estimate of this expenditure elasticity
is in line with previous work in the applied literature, such as in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel
(1997).
Cravino, Lan, and Levchenko (2018) also build a model to derive structural estimations
of the causal effect of monetary shocks on households inflation rates. In their model the
expenditure shares are fixed, and households have homothetic preferences, so in the aggregate
the economy delivers predictions that are very close to those of a representative agent New
Keynesian model. Moreover, because there are no financial frictions, there is a direct mapping
between these inflation rates and the heterogeneous effects on consumption. In my model,
poorer households are more likely to be borrowing constrained, so the drop in consumption
generated by the contractionary monetary shock cannot be smoothed.
Nonhomothetic preferences have been used at the two extremes of the frequency of anal-
ysis: static trade models and long-run growth models. My paper fills a gap by studying
the implications of nonhomotheticity at the business cycle frequency. An exception to this
is Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2010), who use Stone-Geary preferences to generate
countercyclical markups.
Models of trade that incorporate nonhomothetic preferences include Fajgelbaum, Gross-
man, and Helpman (2011), Fieler (2011) and Matsuyama (2000), who study how income
differences across countries can influence trade. When preferences are homothetic, gravity
equations depend on income. However, income per capita is a strong predictor of trade
flows and quality differentiation, whereas population is not. Nonhomotheticity allows for
demand-induced patterns of specialization. Moreover, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016)
use the same demand system as in this paper to quantify the gains from trade along the
distribution of income.
Structural change can arise when economies develop if income elasticities differ from 1,
so that as income grows, consumers spend larger fractions on services, at the expense of
agriculture. Recent papers that use nonhomothetic demands to account for this relationship
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between sectorial demands and income include Mestieri, Lashkari, and Comin (2015), and
Boppart (2014).
On the empirical side, Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) and Hobijn et al. (2009) use differ-
ences in expenditure weights across households to document heterogeneity of inflation rates.
Using scanner level data, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) construct inflation rates at
the household level. They show that variation in prices paid for the same goods is the main
source of heterogeneity, and that studies using aggregate price indices are underestimating
the dispersion of inflation rates. Finally, Coibion et al. (2017) study the effects of monetary
policy shocks on consumption and income inequality, but do not account for heterogeneity
of inflation rates, the channel explored in this paper. My model-derived impulse responses
are consistent with their finding of regresive effects of monetary shocks.
In monetary economics, I provide a new channel through which heterogeneity matters for
the effects of monetary policy: nonhomotheticity yields differences in inflation rates across
households. Previous papers emphasizing the role of heterogeneity for monetary policy
include Auclert (2017), who decomposes the effects of monetary shocks into thee channels
(earnings heterogeneity, a Fisher effect and balance sheet redistributions), and shows how the
marginal propensity to consume differs along these; and Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018),
who show how limited participation in asset markets can generate heterogeneity of marginal
propensities to consume. None of these papers account for heterogeneity of expenditure
patterns across households, which I show to be relevant to understand how households are
impacted differentially.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the general equilib-
rium model. Section 1.3 provides a simplified framework that looks at how the assumption
of nonhomothetic preferences has implications for the savings decisions of the households,
and discusses how it is mapped to the household level data on expenditures. Section 1.4
provides a discussion of the quantitative predictions of the model. Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 A Monetary Model of Inflation Heterogeneity
1.2.1 Outline
I develop a New Keynesian model with multiple sectors with heterogeneity in price stickiness.
I use a continuous time Hugget-Aiyagari model, so households are constrained in their ability
to borrow. This implies that poorer households are less able to substitute consumption
intertemporally, and so inflation has a proportional effect on the purchasing power of their
income. Firms face sector-specific nominal rigidities. There is a continuum of households
with distribution µt over state variables(a, z). Each household has preferences over G goods,
supplies labor, receives profits from the firms and saves in one risk free bond paying real
interest rate r(t). A monetary authority follows a Taylor rule that aims to stabilize the
aggregate inflation rate. All prices are expressed relative to this aggregate price index. I
consider the perfect foresight response to an unanticipated monetary shock, understood as
a zero-probability shock to the intercept of the Taylor rule.
1.2.2 Households
A household characterized by assets and idiosyncratic labor productivity (a,z) solves a prob-
lem given by:
ρvt(a, z) ≡ max
c,`
U(c, `) + [wtz`+ rta+ Tt − x(c, pt)]va,t(a, z)
+µ(z)vz,t(a, z) +
1
2
σ²(z)vzz,t(a, z) + v˙t(a, z)
subject to:
a ≥ a, ` ∈ [0, 1], c ≥ 0
dzt = µ (zt) dt+ σ (zt) dBt, z ∈ [z, z]
The budget constraint is composed of labor income, given by the product of the wage
per efficiency units wt, the idiosyncratic labor productivity z (which because there’s only
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one uncontingent asset, is uninsurable) and hours worked `. Households also earn interest
rt on their assets a, receive transfers Tt generated from the ownership of the firms, and pay
the monetary value x(c, pt) of their real consumption c. The idiosyncratic labor productiv-
ity z follows an Ito Process with Bt a standard Brownian motion. I have generalized the
household’s problem by allowing her expenditure function to be a nonlinear function of con-
sumption c, whereas with homothetic preferences typically used in the litearture one would
have x(c, pt) ≡ Ptc, as for example in Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018). Households in
this economy buy G different goods, and relative prices play a nontrivial role in savings de-
cisions, as explained in the next section. The static Hicksian demands {qg,t(a, z)}1≤g≤G can
be derived using Shephard’s Lemma. The next section provides a more detailed discussion
of the expenditure function.
The first order conditions are:
Uc(c, `) = va,txc (c, pt) (1.1)
−Uc(c, `)
U`(c, `)
=
wtz
xc (c, pt)
(1.2)
The first condition says that the marginal utility of real consumption c has to equal the
marginal utility of wealth, va,t, multiplied by the relative price between wealth and consump-
tion, given by xc (c, pt), which is the monetary cost of an extra unit of real consumption c.
Note that for homothetic preferences, xc (c, pt) = Pt and we get the standard formula. In
this sense, xc (c, pt) plays the role of a household-specific deflator, because it depends on the
level of real consumption c. The second equation is the static condition that equalizes the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption to their relative price, with
the caveat that the price of consumption is xc (c, pt).
Finally, the value function needs to satisfy the boundary conditions:
va,t(a, z)≥Uc(c(a), `(a))
xc (c(a), pt)
with x(c(a), pt) = wtz`(a) + rta+ Tt ∀z, t
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vz,t(a, z) = vz,t(a, z) = 0 ∀a, t
The first condition states that, when the household’s wealth is at the constraint a, the
first order condition for consumption does not hold with equality. The second condition is
derived from the process for z being reflected at z and z.
1.2.3 Firms
Goods in this economy are produced in a nested way. In each sector g ∈ {1, ..., G} there
is a final producer that uses a CES technology function and sells to the households. In
order to produce output Yg,t it buys intermediate inputs from a continuum of monopolistic
competitors, which are sector-specific.
A final good producer solves:
max
{yg,t(j)}j∈[0,1]
Pg,tYg,t −
ˆ 1
0
pg,t(j)yg,t(j)dj subject to Yg,t=
(ˆ 1
0
yg,t(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(1.3)
where Pg,t ≡
(´ 1
0
pg,t(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
is the price charged to households, and pg,t(j) the price
paid to the intermediate producer j of sector g for input yg,t(j). This yields the demand:
yg,t(j) =
(
pg,t(j)
Pg,t
)−
Yg,t (1.4)
An intermediate producer in sector g produces using a linear production technology given
by yg,t(j) = lg,t(j),and solves the problem:
max
{pg,t(j)}t≥0
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ t
0 rsdsΠ (pg,t(j)) dt (1.5)
subject to:
Π (pg,t(j)) = (pg,t(j)− wt) yg,t(j)− λg
2
(pig,t + pit)
2 Yg,t
and the demand given by (1.4). Since the production technology is linear in labor, the
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intermediate firm’s marginal cost is given by the wage wt. Following Rotemberg (1982),
in order to adjust the price, the firm must pay a quadratic cost, expressed in units of the
final good of sector g. The parameter λg governs the degree of price rigidities in sector g.
Since pg,t(j) is expressed in units of the aggregate price index, the total inflation rate is
the sum of the change in the price relative to the aggregate, given by pig,t ≡ p˙g,t(j)pg,t(j) , and the
aggregate inflation rate, pit. Moreover, since pg,t(j) is expressed in units of the aggregate price
index, the firm uses the real interest rate rt (that is, the nominal rate minus the aggregate
inflation rate) to discount profits. In a symmetric equilibrium we have pg,t(j) = Pg,t and
yg,t(j) = Yg,t = Lg,t, so the pricing policy of intermediate producers of sector g is:

λg
(
wt
Pg,t
− − 1

)
+ p˙ig,t + p˙it = (pig,t + pit)
(
rt − pig,t − Y˙g,t
Yg,t
)
(1.6)
See Appendix 1.6.1 for the derivation. As λg → 0 prices become perfectly flexible and
the firms in sector g charge a constant markup over the marginal cost: Pg,t =

−1wt.
1.2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority sets the real interest rate following a Taylor rule that depends on
the aggregate inflation rate:
rt = r + (ϕpi − 1)pit + εt
where r is the real interest rate in the stationary distribution, ϕpi > 1 governs the response
of the nominal interest rate to aggregate inflation, and εt = 0 in the stationary distribution.
The aggregate inflation rate puts weights ωg on the inflation rates, so the weighted average
of inflation rates pig must satisfy:
G∑
g=1
ωgpig,t = 0
with ωg ≥ 0,
∑G
g=1 ωg = 1, since pg,t are relative prices (in units of the aggregate price index).
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1.2.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of paths for prices
{
{Pg,t}1≤g≤G , wt, rt
}
t≥0
, quantities{
{Yg,t, Lg,t}1≤g≤G , at, ct, `t, {qg,t(a, z)}1≤g≤G
}
t≥0
, the aggregate inflation rate {pit}t≥0, and
the distribution {µt}t≥0 such that: (1) households and firms maximize their objectives taking
prices and the distribution as given; (2) the sequence of distributions satisfies aggregate
consistency conditions; (3) markets clear:
• the good g market clearing condition is:
ˆ
qg,t(a, z)dµt = Yg,t
• the asset market clearing condition is:
ˆ
adµt = 0
• the labor market clearing condition is:
ˆ
z`t(a, z)dµt =
G∑
g=1
Lg,t
1.3 Savings, Demand System and Estimation
Before discussing the calibration of the model, this section discusses how aggregators over
goods can influence the savings decision of a household. I first show theoretically that
the inflation rate that a household uses to discount real consumption in the Euler equation
depends on static income elasticities, and so does the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Next, I specify preferences using a demand system that has a long tradition in the applied
literature, and discuss the data used and estimation procedures for the parameters of the
demand system.
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1.3.1 A Generalized Euler Equation
Consider a simplified version of the model of Section 1.2, where a → −∞, so there are
no borrowing constraints and the Euler equation holds with equality for all households.
Moreover, I assume that households supply all their labor inelastically and denote by W h0
the present discounted value of their human and financial wealth. Given the assumption of
time-separable preferences, household h’s utility maximization problem can be decomposed
into two stages. In the first stage, the household solves a static expenditure minimization
problem:
x(cht , pt)≡ min
qht ≡{qhg,t}1≤g≤G
G∑
g=1
pg,tq
h
g,t subject to u(q
h
t ) = c
h
t
where cht is household h’s real consumption at period t. The utility function u represents pref-
erences over goods g ∈ {1, ..., G}. In the second stage, household h chooses it’s intertemporal
allocation of consumption by solving:
max
{cht }t≥0
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρtU(cht )dt
subject to: ˆ ∞
0
exp
(
−
ˆ τ
0
iτdτ
)
x(cht , pt)dt = W
h
0
where it is the nominal interest rate. The utility function U represents preferences over real
consumption over time cht . Note that U is irrelevant for the static minimization problem,
but separating preferences in this nested fashion using u and U facilitates discussion.
Consider the tradeoff that household h faces when deciding how much to consume in
periods t and t+ ∆. A discrete time Euler equation reads:
Uc(c
h
t+Δ)
Uc(cht )
= e−ρ∆
1 + it
xc(cht+Δ, pt+Δ)
/
xc(cht , pt)
We can see that the nominal interest rate is discounted by the change in the marginal
cost of consumption, xc(c
h
t , pt), which measures the monetary cost of acquiring an extra unit
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of real consumption cht .
To settle ideas, consider the case where u represents constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) preferences over goods. Then,
x(cht , pt) =
[
G∑
g=1
(pg,t)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
cht≡Ptcht
In this case, real consumption cht = x(c
h
t , pt)/Pt has the usual expression of expenditure
divided by a price index. The Euler equation reads:
Uc(c
h
t+Δ)
Uc(cht )
= e−ρ∆
1 + it
Pt+∆/Pt
and we see that the inflation rate used to discount the nominal interest rate is the same for all
households. Moreover, the marginal cost of consumption xc(c
h
t , pt) and the ideal price index
(which measures the average cost of real consumption) are both equal to Pt, and there is no
difference between the average and marginal dollars spent. The following lemma generalizes
the Euler equation for any preference specification.
Lemma 1.1. The Euler equation can be characterized in terms of expenditure elasticities
as:
c˙ht
cht
=
it − ρ− 1εxc pi
h
t
−U´´(cht )cht
U´(cht )
− σ(cht , pt)
where:
piht ≡
G∑
g=1
ωg(c
h
t , pt)ε
g
c(c
h
t , pt)
p˙g,t
pg,t
σ(cht , pt) ≡
G∑
g=1
ωg(c
h
t , pt)
G∑
j=1
−ugj(qht )qhj,t
ug(qht )
εgc(c
h
t , pt)
the budget shares are ωhg ≡ pg,tqhg,t
/∑G
j=1 pj,tq
h
j,t, and ε
x
y represents the elasticity of x with
respect to y.
We can see that the inflation rate relevant for household h is a weighted average of the
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changes in the good prices, with the weights equal to the product of the budget shares and
the elasticities of the Hicksian demands with respect to real consumption. Note that, with
homothetic preferences, these elasticities are all 1, and the budget shares are independent
of the level of cht , so the inflation rates are identical across households. The consumption
elasticities are an adjustment that accounts for the fact that, when deciding how much to
consume in a given period, the household must compute the cost of the goods that will be
bought in the margin, and not that of those bought on average. In turn, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) is a weighted average of the real consumption elasticities,
with weights depending on the good-specific IES and the budget shares.
A simple example helps to illustrate the distinction between the average and the marginal
cost of consumption. Consider a household whose preferences are quasilinear. This implies
that, at any given period t, every extra dollar will be spent entirely on the linear good
(because the income effect for all other goods is 0)1. Then, this household’s Euler equation
will only use the inflation rate of the linear good to discount the interest rate. However, if
one where to use the budget shares as weights of the inflation rate, then all inflation rates
would enter the Euler equation, because the household is buying positive amounts of all the
G goods.
Quasilinear preferences represent a case where the distinction between the marginal and
the average cost of consumption is most extreme. The relevance of this distinction is ulti-
mately quantitative and adressed in the next subsection.
1.3.2 Estimating A Demand System
For the remainder of the paper, I assume that the expenditure function is derived from the
Almost Ideal Demand System, given by:
x (c, pt) = a(pt)c
b(pt)
1Provided that the solution is interior, which I assume here for the sake of the argument
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These preferences were first introduced in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and have con-
venient properties. First, the homothetic case is nested by setting b(pt) = 1, and so the
linearity of the Engel curves can be tested. Second, they are a flexible functional form, in
that any other expenditure function will coincide up to a second order approximation. Third,
the demands written in budget share form are approximately linear in the parameters of the
system.
As is standard in the applied literature, a(pt) and b(pt) are parametrized as Translog
price indices that depend on the entire vector of prices:
ln a(pt) = α0 +
G∑
g=1
α˜g ln pg,t +
1
2
G∑
g=1
G∑
j=1
γgj ln pj,t ln pg,t
ln b(pt) =
G∑
g=1
βg ln pg,t
with
∑G
g=1 αg = 1,
∑G
j=1 γgj = 0, γgj = γjg,
∑G
g=1 βg = 0. The budget shares derived from
these preferences are:
ωhg (c
h
t , pt) = α˜g +
G∑
j=1
γgj ln pj,t + βg ln
x
(
cht , pt
)
a(pt)
and the inflation rate in the Euler equation with these preferences reads:
piht =
G∑
j=1
[
ωg(c
h
t , pt) + βg
] p˙g,t
pg,t
Note that βg controls the slope of the Engel curves. If they are zero, budget shares are
independent of expenditure, the second term in the weights of inflation drop, and the budget
shares become independent of consumption, as with homothetic preferences.
In order to estimate the parameters of this demand system, I allow α˜g to depend on
demographic characteristics Dht :
α˜g ≡ αg +Dht ηg
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where demographic characteristics include age, race, marital status, education level, and sex
of the head of the household, family type (single parent, married couple, retired, etc.) and
size, age of the children, and dummies for homeowners, vehiqle owners, quarters and years.
As discussed below, the CES does not provide information on prices paid by households,
and so I am constrained to use aggregate price indices. This generates imprecise estimates of
the price elasticities, because of the limited variation of these indices. Moreover, without any
restrictions on {γgj} one would have to estimate G(G + 1) parameters, generating what is
known in the literature as the "too many parameters" problem. For these reasons, I assume:
γgj =

(
1− 1
G
)
γg if g = j
−γg
G
if g 6= j
With these assumptions, the estimating equation is:
ωhg,t = αg +D
h
t ηg + γg
[
ln pg,t − 1
G
G∑
j=1
ln pj,t
]
+ βg ln
xht
a(pt)
+ νt (1.7)
where νt is measurement error with mean zero. I use an iterative feasible generalized least
squares procedure, which in the context of seemingly unrelated equations is equivalent to
maximum likelihood estimation. For the first iteration I approximate a(pt) with Stone’s
Price Index, which takes the form
∑G
g=1 ωg ln pg,t, with ωg the aggregate shares for category
g. Subsequently, I replace a(pt) with the values for {αg, ηg, γg} from the previous iteration.
1.3.2.1 Data
I use household-level expenditure data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). This
is a rotating panel where each quarter about 6,000 households are asked to report expen-
diture, income and demographic characteristics. The data are composed of two separate
surveys, Interview (which focuses on large expenditures) and Diary (which tracks smaller,
more frequent expenditures). No household reports information for both surveys, yet esti-
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mation of (1.7) requires household-level variables, such as expenditure and the demographic
controls. For this reason, I use exclusively the Interview Survey, which nonetheless covers
about 95% of expenditures. Moreover, I drop categories of good corresponding to durables,
since these are purchased infrequently and may not be so responsive to transitory changes
in prices generated by monetary shocks. These leaves about 80% of all expenditures. As in
Aguiar and Bils (2015), I restrict the sample to urban households whose head is between 25
and 64 years old, and similar to them, I require that households report positive expenditures
in at least 15 out of 36 categories. I also truncate the sample by dropping households at the
top and bottom 5% of the distribution of expenditure, to avoid the problems of outliers and
top-coding. The final sample is composed of 57, 961 quarter-household observations over the
period 2010-2016.
Estimation of (1.7) requires prices, which are not reported in the CES. In order to match
goods in the CES to the price indices provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
I manually match Classes in the CES and the BLS. Even though the frequencies of price
adjustments reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) are disaggregated by Entry Level
Item (ELI), price indices reported by the BLS are not found at this level of disaggregation.
Moreover, using a very disaggregated level increases substantially the percentage of house-
holds that report zero expenditure in a large number of categories. Finally, I restrict the
sample to 2010-2016 because prior to 2010 some price indices are not published by the BLS.
1.3.2.2 Results
Table 1.1 reports the estimates for the expenditure semi-elasticities βg for the G = 36
categories of goods, sorted by the share of aggregate expenditure. Recall that goods with
βg < 0 are necessities, and therefore consumed relatively more by households with low
expenditure, whereas goods with βg > 0 are luxuries, and consumed relatively more by
households with high expenditure. Among the largest categories as measured by the share of
aggregate expenditure, some of the categories that are estimated to be necessities are Motor
fuel, Gas (piped) and electricity, and Telephone services. On the other hand, categories
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Table 1.1: Expenditure Semi-elasticities βg estimated from Equation (1.7)
Description βg ∗ 100 p-value Agg. Share
Food away from home 0.136 0.00 11.2%
Motor fuel -0.424 0.00 11.0%
Hospital and related services 0.024 0.40 10.2%
Gas (piped) and electricity -0.381 0.00 7.4%
Telephone services -0.283 0.00 5.7%
Tuition, other school fees, and childcare 0.547 0.00 5.1%
Professional services 0.094 0.00 4.8%
Motor vehicle insurance -0.157 0.00 4.4%
Recreation services 0.148 0.00 3.5%
Household operations 0.271 0.00 3.4%
Information technology, hardware and services -0.141 0.00 3.1%
Public transportation 0.126 0.00 2.9%
Motor vehicle maintenance and repair 0.004 0.72 2.8%
Water and sewer and trash collection services -0.124 0.00 2.4%
Lodging away from home 0.149 0.00 2.3%
Tenants’ and household insurance -0.063 0.00 2.0%
Women’s apparel 0.003 0.54 1.9%
Miscellaneous personal services 0.118 0.00 1.8%
Pets, pet products and services 0.003 0.75 1.7%
Personal care services 0.004 0.31 1.6%
Motor vehicle fees -0.010 0.02 1.3%
Tobacco and smoking products -0.088 0.00 1.3%
Alcoholic beverages at home -0.016 0.00 1.1%
Men’s apparel 0.018 0.00 1.0%
Window and floor coverings and other linens 0.019 0.03 0.9%
Footwear -0.007 0.01 0.9%
Alcoholic beverages away from home 0.043 0.00 0.9%
Fuel oil and other fuels -0.015 0.02 0.6%
Jewelry and watches 0.023 0.00 0.5%
Recreational reading materials -0.007 0.00 0.5%
Girls’ apparel -0.002 0.42 0.4%
Boys’ apparel -0.005 0.03 0.4%
Educational books and supplies 0.004 0.10 0.4%
Infants’ and toddlers’ apparel -0.010 0.00 0.3%
Miscellaneous personal goods 0.001 0.18 0.1%
Personal care products -0.002 0.01 0.1%
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estimated to be luxuries are Food away from home, Hospital and related services, and Tuition,
other school fees, and childcare. Most of the β’s are statistically significant.
1.4 Quantitative Results
I now embed the Almost Ideal Demand System into the model of Section 1.2, and study the
heterogeneous effects of a monetary shock on consumption across households.
1.4.1 Calibration
The flow utility is specified as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988):
u(c, `) =
1
1− γ
(
c− ψz `
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)1−γ
so that assumptions about preferences over goods generates no income effects for labor
supply. As in Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2016), I set γ = 1 and ϕ = 1, so the elasticity
of labor supply is 1. Note however that because of preferences being GHH, the IES is lower
than 1, and close to 0.55 on average in the stationary distribution.
The disutility of labor is scaled by z, the uninsurable idiosyncratic labor productivity, so
that the choice of hours worked is not affected by it. This allows to have a direct mapping
from z to income in the data. Henceforth, z is assumed to follow an Ohrstein Ullenbeck
stochastic process, the continuous time equivalent of an AR(1):
dzt = −µ ln ztdt+ σdBt
where Bt is a standard Brownian Motion. As in Aiyagari (1994), I set µ = 0.15 so that
annual incomes have an autocorrelation of 0.86 and σ = 0.01 so that the annual standard
deviation of incomes is 0.15.
In the stationary distribution we have pig = pi = 0, so Pg =

−1w. Normalizing Pg = 1
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we get w = −1

. Henceforth, as is standard in the New Keynesian literature, I set  = 0.1 to
generate markups of 11%. In order to calibrate the parameters λg governing the degrees of
price rigidities, note that to a first order approximation, the pricing policy using quadratic
adjustment costs coincides with the one derived under Calvo price stickiness (where firms face
Poisson arrival oportunities to adjust prices). Therefore, I match the coefficients associated
with the marginal cost in both pricing equations. Let θg be the frequency of price adjustments
under Calvo pricing. Then,

λg
=
θg (1− e−ρ (1− θg))
1− θg
I obtain θg from the frequencies of price adjustments for regular prices estimated by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). They report these frequencies by ELI, whereas my 36
categories correspond to classes. To compute class-level frequencies I average ELI-level
frequencies weighting them by the shares of expenditure of each ELI.
Given the normalization Pg = 1, we have a(p) = b(p) = 1 and x(c, p) = c. The first order
condition (1.2) for the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor in the
stationary distribution becomes ψ`ϕ = w. Given ϕ = 1, I set ψ = 2.7 so that households
work 1/3 of their unit endowment of time in the stationary equilibrium. I set ρ = 0.0052
so that the annual risk free real rate is 2%. As in Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018), I
make transfers Tt proportional to labor productivity z and set the borrowing limit a equal
to average quarterly labor income.
For the Taylor rule, I assume that ϕpi = 1.25, a standard value used in the literature,
and that the weights ωg used by the monetary authority to compute aggregate inflation
correspond to the aggregate expenditure shares observed in the stationary equilibrium. The
monetary shock to be studied is ε0 = −1% with εt = e−0.5tε0, as in Kaplan, Moll, and
Violante (2018).
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1.4.2 Frequency of Price Adjustments and Expenditure Elasticities
The degree to which households along the distribution will be impacted by the monetary
shock depends on how exposed they are to the goods whose prices are more sensitive to it. In
this model, the elasticity of the inflation rate with respect to the monetary shock is governed
by the parameter λg, which in turn is inversely related to the frequency of price adjustment
θg. A poorer household will spend relatively more on goods with βg < 0, so we should
expect to see regressive effects from monetary shocks if the expenditure semi-elasticities βg
are negatively correlated with the frequencies of price adjustments θg. Figure (1.1) shows
that this is precisely the case:
Figure 1.1: Frequency of Price Adjustments and Expenditure Elasticities
The horizontal axis shows the expenditure semi-elasticities βg estimated using the procedure
from Subsection (1.3.2.2). The vertical axis shows the frequencies of price adjustment for
regular prices θg estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). A value of 50 means that,
for that category, 50% of prices are changing any given month. The size of the circle is
determined by the aggregate share of expenditure. Labels are reported for categories with
shares above 2.5%.
Necessities such as Motor fuel and Gas and electricity have a high frequency of price ad-
justments, whereas luxuries such as Tuition, other school fees, and childcare, and Household
operations (e.g., home maintenance and repair services, domestic services) are infrequently
adjusted.
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1.4.3 Inflation Heterogeneity and Consumption Responses
The response of aggregate variables to the monetary shock is in line with the results of the
literature. After the 0.25% expansionary shock, aggregate expenditure, labor and inflation,
and the real wage increase.
I now turn attention to the model’s prediction for inflation rates across goods. Figure
1.2 shows the response of inflation rates pig after the shock. Recall that these inflation rates
are deviations from the aggregate inflation rate pi, since prices are expressed in units of the
aggregate price index. As expected, the goods with lower λg values, corresponding to lower
costs of price adjustments, have higher inflation rates pig. Goods with inflation rates higher
than the aggregate rate include Lodging away from home, Fuel oil, Gas and electricity, Motor
fuel and Public transportation (which includes airline fares).
Figure 1.2: Heterogeneity of Inflation Rates pig After a 1% Expansionary Shock
How are households with different levels of wealth a and productivity z impacted by the
monetary shock? In order to answer this question I track the dynamics of real consumption
c for four households: (1) a household that has wealth a = a and productivity z = z;
(2) a household that has wealth a = a and productivity z = z; (3) a household that has
high wealth a > 0 and productivity z = z; (4) and a household that has high wealth
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a > 0 and productivity z = z. This categorization allows to separately understand the
roles played by income and the borrowing constraint on the cross sectional response of
consumption. Moreover, in order to understand the role of expenditure heterogeneity, I
consider the difference in the response of consumption for two models: the one outlined in
this section, and one where preferences are homothetic, so βg = 0 ∀g. Figure 1.3 shows this
difference divided by the household’s consumption in the stationary equilibrium. Formally,
it plots the paths of:
c
{βg 6=0}
t (a, z)− c{St}(a, z)
c{St}(a, z)
− c
{βg=0}
t (a, z)− c{St}(a, z)
c{St}(a, z)
where c
{βg 6=0}
t (a, z) is the value of consumption at period t for a household with state variables
(a, z) in the model with nonhomothetic preferences, c
{βg=0}
t (a, z) corresponds to the model
with homothetic preferences, and c{St}(a, z) to the stationary equilibrium2.
Figure 1.3: Differential Response of Consumption with/without Nonhomothetic Preferences
The model with nonhomothetic preferences delivers the prediction that households with
low wealth and low productivity are worse off throughout the entire transition back to the
2In the stationary equilibrium we have a(p) = b(p) = 1, so both models with homothetic and nonhomo-
thetic preferences deliver the same outcome.
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stationary equilibrium, relative to a model with homothetic preferences. This is explained by
the fact that these households suffer higher inflation, and cannot smooth out over time the
expansionary effects of the monetary shock because of the borrowing constraint. In contrast,
households that either have high wealth or high productivity (or both) are better suited
to smooth consumption over time. In fact, the difference in the response of consumption
across models, with consumption in the model with nonhomothetic preferences lower in the
first quarters and higher thereafter, resembles the difference in aggregate expenditure across
models. In other words, these richer households react similar to aggregate variables.
1.5 Conclusion
I have relaxed the assumption of homothetic preferences over goods, and estimated ex-
penditure and price elasticities using a flexible demand system. I then showed how these
elasticities influence the response of expenditure and savings to a monetary shock. A key
concept, previously overlooked in the literature, is the distinction between the valuation of
the average and the marginal dollars spent. Thinking about savings decisions in the margin
has the implication that one needs to adjust the weights on goods inflation rates by expen-
diture elasticities, and this uncovers heterogeneity in inflation rates across households after
monetary shocks.
This model can be used to address normative and positive problems associated with
the effects of monetary policy. How should a central bank that has redistributive concerns
conduct monetary policy? And in particular, should it target an inflation rate that puts
weights on good prices different from those of the aggregate price index? On the positive
side, what would be the effect of monetary policy on aggregate expenditure if the distribution
of wealth were more/less unequal than the one observed? How would monetary policy impact
aggregate variables if services represented a larger share of the economy?
An alternative way to incorporate expenditure heterogeneity is explored in Cravino, Lan,
and Levchenko (2018). They assume that there are many households with heterogeneous
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preferences, with the parameters governing the expenditure shares jointly distributed with
the household’s labor productivity. This provides a computational challenge in the context of
models where households have endogenous state variables, as one would have to solve an HJB
equation for each type of preferences. My model provides an alternative that circunvents
this complication.
The predicted differences in consumption across the distribution of households are ad-
mittedly small, given the small effects on relative prices generated by the monetary shock.
Future work could address the welfare implications of large variations in exchange rates,
which are typically associated with significant changes in relative prices, in particular be-
tween tradable and nontradable goods. Moreover, in this model I have muted the effects of
demographic characteristics by aggregating over them, yet one could be interested in under-
standing how households with, for instance, different age profiles, are affected by monetary
policy.
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1.6 Model Appendix
1.6.1 Intermediate Firm’s Problem
This section derives the pricing policy of an intermediate firm. Firm j in sector g faces
nominal rigidity λg and solves the problem:
max
{pg,t(j)}t≥0
ˆ ∞
0
e−
´ t
0 rsdsΠ (pg,t(j)) dt
subject to:
Π (pg,t(j)) = (pg,t(j)− wt) yg,t(j)− λg
2
(pig,t + pit)
2 Yg,t
and the demand given by (1.4). The Hamiltonian is:
H (pg (j) , p˙g (j) , η) ≡ (pg (j)− w)
(
pg (j)
Pg
)−ε
Yg − λg
2
(
p˙g (j)
pg (j)
+ pi
)2
PgYg + ηp˙g (j)
The first order conditions are:
(
pg (j)
Pg
)−ε
Yg − ε (pg (j)− w)
(
pg (j)
Pg
)−ε−1
Yg
Pg
+ λg
(
p˙g (j)
pg (j)
+ pi
)
p˙g (j)
pg (j)
PgYg
pg (j)
= rη − η˙
η = λg
(
p˙g (j)
pg (j)
+ pi
)
PgYg
pg (j)
In a symmetric equilibrium pg(j, t) = Pg(t), so:
Yg
[
1− ε (Pg − w) 1
Pg
+ λgpig (pig + pi)
]
= rη − η˙
η = λg (pig + pi)Yg ⇒ η˙ = λg (p˙ig + p˙i)Yg + λg (pig + pi) Y˙g
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Substituting out η and dividing by λgYg yields equation (1.6).
1.7 Numerical Appendix
1.7.1 Stationary Equilibrium
This describes the algorithm used to solve the stationary equilibrium. Both here and for the
transition the HJB of the household and the Kolmogorov forward equation are computed
using the methods described in Achdou et al. (2017).
1. Set Pg = 1∀g and w = ((ε− 1)/ε). Guess r.
2. Compute aggregate labor:
L = [(w/ψ)](1/ϕ)
3. Compute transfers:
T =
1

L
4. Solve the household’s problem.
5. Aggregating individual’s policy function compute implied savings:
S′ =
ˆ
adµt
6. If S ′ is close to 0, end. Else, update r using a relaxation method and return to step 4.
1.7.2 Transitional Dynamics
1. Guess rt
T
t=0, which is updated in every iteration, and {Pg,t}, TtTt=0, which are only used
in the first iteration.
2. Use the Taylor rule to compute the aggregate inflation rate pit.
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3. Use an aggregate version of the pricing policies to compute wt. To derive it, multiply
the pricing policies (1.6) by ωg and sum over g. Using
∑G
g=1 ωgpig,t =
∑G
g=1 ωgp˙ig,t = 0
yields:
0 =
∑G
g=1
ωg

λg
(
wt
Pg,t
− − 1

)
+ p˙i − pir
which can be solved backwards with terminal condition wT = w.
4. Use the pricing policies of the firms to compute the inflation rates pig.
5. Solve the household’s problem.
6. Aggregating individual’s policy function compute implied savings and transfers.
7. If St is close to 0, end. Else, update rt using:
rt = r + ζSdSt
where ζS > 0, and return to step 2.
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CHAPTER 2
Banks Adjust Slowly: Evidence and Lessons for
Modelling
2.1 Introduction
Since the Great Financial Crisis, policy makers and academics alike are reassessing their
models about banks. This paper studies how to set up the problem of a bank such that
it reflects its essential features. We report five empirical facts that inform us about the
objective and constraints of banks using U.S. bank holding company data.
Our study of bank data is summarized by the following five facts:
1. Banks’ book and market leverage ratios behaved very differently during the 2008-
2009 crisis. Market leverage rose dramatically during the crisis whereas book leverage
remained constant. Between 2007Q3 and 2014Q4, bank holding companies lost 54% of
their market capitalization. Book equity losses represented only 7% and were entirely
made up by equity issuances.
2. Market values capture information that book values do not, and book values do not
fully respond to shocks.
3. Neither regulatory nor market constraints bind strictly for most banks. The cross-
section of banks shows a large dispersion in individual market leverage. Few banks are
close to their regulatory constraints.
4. Banks appear to operate with a target leverage ratio. In response to an unexpected
negative stock-return shock, market-leverage increases and adjusts slowly to return to
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its initial level.
5. Prior to the crisis, in response to an unexpected negative stock-return shock, banks
would primarily sell assets. Post-crisis, banks intensified the use of retained earnings
and equity issuances, and reduced the extent of adjustment through asset sales.
These facts highlight several essential features of the data that place restrictions on the
formulation of banks’ problem. Fact (1) suggests that it is not innocuous which state variable
one picks for the formulation of the bank problem as book and market leverage ratios diverged
dramatically during the crisis. Fact (2) suggests that during the crisis, market values depicted
a more accurate picture of banks’ health. Banks, however, do face regulatory constraints
that are formulated in book values. Even though – as suggested by fact (3) – market and
regulatory constraints do not bind exactly they still can affect banks’ decisions in a dynamic
way.
Fact (4) suggests that banks target a market-based leverage ratio. When a shock moves
banks away from this ratio, they take time to return to it. This finding is based on cross-
sectional variation in market returns to individual bank stock returns—we call those de-
viations from the mean return shocks. The idea behind our identification strategy is that
bank stock returns pick-up information about the effective value of a bank—information not
contained in their books. If markets are efficient, return shocks should be unpredictable.
Thus, a negative market-return shocks, that is not accompanied by a change in book values,
is an indication of bank losses that have not been accounted in accounting books. Hence, re-
turn shocks allow us to investigate how a position on a bank’s balance sheet evolves after the
bank suffers losses that are not yet written down. We estimate that in response to a negative
return shock, which mechanically pushes market-leverage on impact, banks take actions to
slowly revert back to the same market leverage target they had prior to the shock. Banks
reverse their increase in market leverage by operating on all possible margins of adjustment:
they tend to retain earnings, increase external equity, and reduce their liabilities. However,
the process is gradual.
Fact (5) summarizes the margins used by banks to delever since the crisis. Pre-crisis,
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a bank that experienced a negative return shock relied mostly on asset sales to gradually
reduce their liabilities. In the post-crisis, banks with negative excess-returns relied relatively
more on alternative measures to delever: either through external equity issuances or retained
earnings, with many banks paying zero dividends.
Section 2.2 presents our set of five facts and Section 2.3 concludes.
2.2 Five Facts
We base our five facts on a panel of bank-level data, focusing on top-tier United States
Bank Holding Companies (BHCs).1 BHCs provide a comprehensive picture of the activi-
ties of a financial organization rather than the narrower accounts of their commercial bank
subsidiaries—for example, we study Citigroup rather than Citibank. BHCs can also be
matched to market data, which is an important part of the analysis. Book data is obtained
from the FR Y-9C regulatory reports that BHCs file with the Federal Reserve, and merged
with market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We analyze the
data from 2000 Q1 to 2015 Q4, and extend the sample when we estimate impulse response
functions. The FR Y-9C filed by BHCs with total assets above $500 million.2 Since the
banking industry is highly concentrated, our sample is representative of the industry. We
drop entrants to correct for the entry of major financial institutions.3
2.2.1 The Financial Crisis in the Time Series
Aggregate Balance Sheet Components. To get a sense about how the crisis affected
banks, we begin by reporting the evolution of key balance sheet components in Figure 2.1.
1A bank holding company is an umbrella company which holds banks, and other financial institutions,
while a commercial banks is a single bank which provides traditional banking services like deposits and
loans. For example, Citibank is a commercial bank, which is held by Citigroup, which is a BHC which holds
Citibank and other banks, including non-commercial banks.
2Prior to 2006 Q1, this threshold was $100 million, and the threshold became $1 Billion in March 2015.
3Without this correction, we see a spurious increase in the assets of the traditional industry due to the
reclassification of large actors such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs into bank holding companies.
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Figure 2.1: Balance Sheets of BHCs
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Notes: These figures show data on assets, liabilities, loans, and loans net of ALL for BHCs. Data come
from the FR Y-9C. Loans net of ALL refers to loans minus the allowance for loan losses (this subtracts
out “probable and estimable” future losses on the current stock of loans). All variables converted to 2012
Q1 dollars using the seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator. Left panel shows aggregate series, dropping new
entrants. Right panel shows data for the “Big Four” largest BHCs. Note that the spike in the balance sheet
of Wells Fargo is due to its acquisition of Wachovia. Similarly, JP Morgan purchased and took on Bear
Stearns and WaMu, while Bank of America took on Merrill Lynch and the remainder of CountryWide.
This figure shows total assets, liabilities, and loans—not netting out the allowance for loan
losses–for the aggregate banking sector (left panel) and the four largest BHCs in terms of
assets. The banking industry is highly concentrated: the “Big Four” largest BHCs account
for roughly 50 percent of aggregate assets. At the onset of the crisis, the growth of bank
assets, loans, and liabilities slowed down, but never dropped as dramatically as bank equity
market valuations (see below). Loans, the largest component of bank assets, stagnated during
the crisis and eventually fell. By 2009 Q4, the book value of loans net of the allowance for
loan losses had fallen by $361 billion, a drop of only 6.84%.4 This number is driven only in
part by losses as banks also slowed down the issuances of new loans.
Figure 2.2 shows that provisions for loan losses and net charge-offs only reached their
peak in 2009 and 2010 respectively, and remained quite elevated at least through 2011, well
after the recession had ended and many years after market values had crashed (see below).
4The allowance for loan losses is an estimate of probable loan losses for the loans currently on the balance
sheet. The next subsection will provide more detail on how bank accountants come up with this number.
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Figure 2.2: Net Charge-offs
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Notes: These figures show data coming from the FR Y-9C. The data are aggregate time series, dropping new
entrants. The left panel shows net trading revenue and profits/losses on credit exposures and interest rate
exposures. The right panel shows net charge-offs of loans (charge-offs minus recoveries), and decomposes
this into loans backed by real estate, commercial and inustrial (C&I) loans, loans to individuals (these loans
are for consumption purposes and are not secured by real estate), and all other loans (e.g. interbank loans,
agricultural loans, and loans to foreign governments).
The decomposition of net charge-offs shows that these losses were heavily driven by real
estate, suggesting they were associated with the housing crisis.5
Net Worth Measures: Market Equity versus Book Equity. To get a sense about how
the crisis affected banks, we report the changes in select aggregate balance sheet components
and aggregate bank equity return data since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2007
Q3 in Table 2.1. We do so in two ways. We first fit a linear trend to the logged real series
and report deviations from that trend in the first three columns.6 We estimate the trend
using the data through 2007 Q3 and report changes since at that trend.7 Second, we report
5When a bank has a loss that is estimable and probable, it first provisions for loan losses, which shows
up as PLL. Later when the loss occurs, the asset is charged off and thus taken off the books, which shows
up as charge-offs, although occasionally the bank can recover the asset later. Net charge-offs is charge-offs
minus recoveries. We show a decomposition by category for net charge-offs but not for PLL because the FR
Y-9C does not provide information on PLL by loan category.
6We use the seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator to adjust for inflation, and report all values in 2012 Q1
dollars.
7Since market return and book ROE are flows rather than levels, we detrend by simply subtracting the
pre-crisis average. Also, since flows can be negative, we use log(1 + r) instead of log(r). A concern with
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simply the real changes since 2007 Q3 in the last three columns. Each column computes the
change until the fourth quarter of the year indicated by the column. For aggregate bank
balance sheet quantities, we focus our attention on the aggregate series of loans and different
measures of equity since these are the quantities that are at the hear of macro-finance models.
We also report the changes in bank equity return data to provide a summary of shareholder
losses and in the S&P stock market index for comparison. The striking fact emerging from
Table 2.1 is the difference between the aggregated series of market and book valuations. The
market data—market capitalization and market equity returns—shows that banks suffered
large valuation losses during the crisis. The book data—book equity and common book
equity and book equity return —shows only small changes. Between 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4,
market capitalization dropped by 54 per cent ($705 billion) and by the fourth quarter of 2010
the gap was still 30 per cent ($378 billion). Much of this rebound followed from new equity
issuances. By contrast, real book equity did not fall during the crisis. It actually increased
substantially post crisis. In fact, book losses were entirely made up for by equity issuances.8
In comparison, capitalized book equity return losses amounted to only $66 billions in 2009
Q4 that is less than one tenth of the capitalized market equity losses.
Figure 2.3 plots market equity (market capitalization), book equity, and preferred equity
for the aggregate banking sector (left panel) and the four largest banks (right panel) in
terms of assets.9 In the appendix, we also provide a similar analysis of aggregate issuances
and dividends. The figure shows that the discrepancy between market– and book equity
cannot be explained by preferred equity, which is included in book equity but not in market
log-linear detrending is that it could be based on an unsustainable boom, yielding an overestimate of the
size of the cyclical deviation. Simply looking at raw changes in this series sidesteps these concerns, but only
by not dealing with the trend altogether. We report both estimates for completeness, but we acknowledge
that each of these estimates is imperfect. We also computed (available upon request) estimates from HP-
filtered data. The HP-filtered residuals were typically of substantially smaller magnitude then the residuals
estimated with a log-linear trend. The HP-filter seemed to be overfitting the data and treating as trend
what is really just a persistent cyclical component.
8We measure market valuation of banks in terms of market capitalization and not prices. Therefore, share
dilutions cannot explain the difference with book values.
9The fact that book equity for public BHCs is so close to book equity for all BHCs is a result of the high
concentration of equity in the largest banks.
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Table 2.1: Aggregate Descriptive Statistics .
Log-Linear Real Change
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Market
Cap.
-61.21% -49.98% -42.86% -54.08% -39.35% -29.03%
(-$945B) (-$790B) (-$694B) (-$705B) (-$513B) (-$378B)
Book
Equity
-3.46% -1.50% -4.41% 11.83% 21.70% 25.97%
(-$32B) (-$15B) (-$46B) ($94B) ($172B) ($206B)
Common
Equity
-28.44% -11.69% -10.42% -17.35% 8.29% 16.64%
(-$275B) (-$120B) (-$114B) (-$145B) ($69B) ($139B)
Loans
Net of
ALL
2.68% -10.41% -14.33% 2.58% -6.84% -7.27%
($141B) (-$571B) (-$819B) ($136B) (-$361B) (-$384B)
S&P 500
-25.55% -7.01% 4.63% -42.08% -28.83% -21.20%
Bank
Market
Return
-57.87% -61.42% -60.23% -54.26% -55.28% -50.78%
(-$755B) (-$801B) (-$785B) (-$708B) (-$721B) (-$662B)
Book
Return
on Equity
-20.30% -27.89% -33.58% -7.84% -6.34% -3.11%
(-$171B) (-$236B) (-$284B) (-$66B) (-$54B) (-$26B)
Notes: Top row shows cyclical deviations in percentage points since 2007 Q3; bottom row shows deviations
converted into raw values. Book equity refers to book equity of publicly traded BHCs. Loans net of ALL
refers to loans minus the allowance for loan losses (this subtracts out “probable and estimable” future losses
on the current stock of loans). All variables deflated using the seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator. Level
variables are converted to 2012 Q1 dollars, flow variables are deflated by subtracting inflation. Bank market
return deviations and book return on equity are cumulated since the end of 2007 Q3, and dollar values are
obtained by multiplying the cumulative percentage point deviation by real market capitalization and real
book equity at the end of 2007 Q3, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Book Equity and Market Capitalization for Bank Holding Companies.
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Notes: These figures show data on book equity, market capitalization, and preferred equity for BHCs. Book
equity and preferred equity data come from the FR Y-9C, and market capitalization data is based on CRSP
data. All variables converted to 2012 Q1 dollars using the seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator. The left panel
shows aggregate series, dropping new entrants, with “Equity” referring to book equity for all BHCs in sample
and “Equity (Public BHCs)” referring to only publicly-traded BHCs that can be matched to CRSP data.
The right panel shows data for the “Big Four” largest BHCs, with “Equity” referring to book equity.
capitalization.10 The pattern for the largest banks is very similar.11 Citigroup is an extreme
example of the discrepancy between book and market values. The bank lost 90% in terms
of its market capitalization. But according to its book equity measure, Citigroup did fine.
Its book equity continued to grow as it had before the crisis.12
We summarize this section with our first fact:
Fact 2.1. Book values and market values diverged during the crisis. Between 2007 Q3
and 2008 Q4, BHCs lost $705 billion in market capitalization, a decline of 54%. Book equity
losses were only $66 billion (7.84%) and were entirely made up for with new equity issuances.
The large discrepancy between market and book equity suggests an outsized role for bank
10Preferred equity rose temporarily during the crisis due to TARP.
11The discontinuities in the individual bank series reflect mergers and acquisitions, e.g. the acquisition of
Wachovia by Wells Fargo during the crisis.
12Citigroup suffered heavy losses during the crisis and did not undergo any major mergers or acquisitions,
making it a particularly clean test case.
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accounting rules.13 For example, banks have some flexibility regarding when to acknowledge
book looses. Changes in the underlying market value (see filing instructions for FR-Y-9C
BHCs regulatory reports) are not included by any loan income measure for loans held on
books. A bad loan is only written off once the loss has occured as opposed to when the loss is
expected. Thus book measures are bound to be backward looking. This is also evident from
Figure 2.2. It shows that loan charge-off peaked in 2010 when the crisis had been already
called off. The next section analyzes this issue more deeply. It shows that market values
contain information that are not contained in books.
2.2.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis
Information Content in Book Values and Market Capitalization. The nature of
book values implies that they tend to be backward looking. The fact that loan charge-offs
peaked well after the crisis (see Figure 2.2) is suggestive evidence for this very idea. Perhaps
banks’ market capitalizations are better in capturing available information about their net
worth. We test this notion using cross-sectional regressions of market capitalization on
book equity and profitability measures. Thereby we rely on the efficient markets hypothesis
that suggests that market values reflect all available information about future dividends,
and, by extension, about banks future profits and net worth today. If this is true, and
market capitalization contains additional information about bank profitability not captured
by book values, then market capitalization will be correlated with other variables that reflect
profitability, even after we condition on book equity. We run cross-sectional regressions of
the following form:
log (Market Cap.i) = α + β log (Book Equityi) + f(Xi) + i,
13Another natural candidate to explain the differences between market and book valuations are movements
in risk premia. For this reason, we compare the percentage drop in the stock market index, the S&P 500, to
drop in bank valuations (see Table 2.1). It is substantially smaller (a drop of 28.83% by 2009 Q4) than the
cumulative drop in the market return of BHCs (55.28% over the same time period). Hence, the discrepancy
is unlikely to be driven by differences in risk premia alone.
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where f(X) represents polynomials in our variables of interest, and i indexes banks. The
regression is run in the cross-section for a single time period, so there is no t subscript.
Each observations is thus a bank in the selected quarter. We then test whether f(X)
adds substantial predictive power to the regression. If it does, this suggests that market
capitalization captures information in f(X) that book equity does not fully capture.14
For example, one variable we will examine is the (logged) ratio of delinquent loans to
total loans.15 If books are slow to reflect true conditions, then we would expect that, during
the crisis, market capitalization will be decreasing in the delinquent loans ratio, controlling
for book equity. Market participants will incorporate loan delinquencies into their valuation
of the bank, while books will not have adjusted yet. Because of delayed acknowledgment of
losses, book values will be over-optimistic about how many delinquent loans will eventually
be repaid, and will also fail to incorporate the degree to which loan delinquencies today
may indicate more delinquencies tomorrow. This pattern is what we will find in the data:
during the crisis, market capitalization is declining in the delinquent loans ratio, controlling
for book equity.
Table 2.2 shows the results of our analysis for a pre-crisis period (2006 Q1) and a post-
crisis period (2009 Q1). We maintain a consistent sample by running our analysis on a
cross-section of banks for which all of the variables we use are available. In both periods,
return on book equity (RoE) over the past year plays a substantial role in explaining market
capitalization. Moreover, future RoE, over the next year and over the year after that, also
have a reasonable degree of predictive power, even after controlling for the current RoE.
This suggests that market participants care about profits and are forward looking: they
have some ability to predict future profitability and incorporate this into their valuation.
Moreover, although this information is known to market participants, it is not captured by
book values. The delinquent loans ratio has sizable predictive power during the post-crisis
14Of course, an alternative explanation is that market cap over-reacts to the information in f(X). However,
at least the direction of the effects are what we would expect if books are sluggish and market capitalization
reflects the truth.
15We define a loan as delinquent if it past due more than 30 days or if it is in non-accrual.
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period, reflecting the importance of concerns about loan performance during the post-crisis
period. Notably, the predictive power of the delinquent loans ratio goes away once we add
in controls for present and future RoE, which suggests, unsurprisingly, that delinquent loans
affect market values primarily through profits. Log liabilities, which represents leverage, also
play a modest role in explaining market capitalization (since we control for log equity, adding
log liabilities to the regression is equivalent to adding in log liabilities minus log equity, which
is a measure of log book leverage). We also learn something from the root mean squared error
of these regressions. It is much higher post-crisis, consistent with the divergence of book and
market values and suggesting that books had less informational content post-crisis. To help
us visualize the additional information content of market values over and above book values,
we also construct graphs. To do this, we first run the regression, y = α + f(X) + δW + ,
where y is the outcome variable, W are the control variables, and f(X) is a polynomial in
the regressor of interest. We then construct y − α − δW and plot this on the vertical axis.
We plot the regressor of interest, X, on the horizontal axis. By construction, the polynomial
f(X) that best fits y will also be the polynomial that best fits y − α − δW , so this graph
allows us to plot f(X) and assess goodness of fit. In Figure 2.4, we show these graphs,
with log market capitalization as the outcome, for a quartic in log RoE over the past year
(controlling for log book equity), and for a quartic in log RoE over the next year (controlling
for log book equity and a quartic in log RoE over the past year).16 These graphs confirm that
market capitalization, controlling for book equity, is increasing in both RoE over the past
year and in RoE over the next year. The non-linear regression specification is important.
For example, in the post-crisis period, there is a left tail of banks with very negative RoE; in
this region the marginal effect of RoE on market capitalization is much smaller. Our second
fact is the take-away from this analysis:
Fact 2.2. Market values capture information that book values do not, and book values do
not fully respond to shocks.
16For improved visibility, we exclude outliers from the graph window by limiting the graph’s horizontal
axis to values within ±3 standard deviations from the mean.
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Table 2.2: Partial R2 for Different Predictors of Market Capitalization.
2006 Q1
Log Book Equity 0.964 0.442 0.964 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.710
Log Liabilities (Quadratic) 0.102 0.083
Log Delinquent Loans Ratio (Quartic) 0.020 0.019
Log RoE over Past Year (Quartic) 0.593 0.209 0.220 0.203
Log RoE over Next Year (Quartic) 0.105 0.062 0.086
Log RoE Year After Next (Quartic) 0.036 0.025
Root Mean Squared Error 0.307 0.292 0.305 0.197 0.187 0.185 0.176
Number of Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323 323
2009 Q1
Log Book Equity 0.837 0.255 0.872 0.909 0.910 0.912 0.191
Log Liabilities (Quadratic) 0.027 0.022
Log Delinquent Loans Ratio (Quartic) 0.307 0.050
Log RoE over Past Year (Quartic) 0.473 0.267 0.244 0.204
Log RoE over Next Year (Quartic) 0.057 0.031 0.014
Log RoE Year After Next (Quartic) 0.068 0.057
Root Mean Squared Error 0.694 0.687 0.580 0.508 0.497 0.483 0.466
Number of Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
Notes: These tables show results from a cross-sectional regression of log market capitalization on log book
equity and other variables. The first six rows of each table show the partial R2 associated with that group of
variables (how much of the remaining variance in the outcome is explained by that group of variables, after
controlling for the other variables). Log book equity enters linearly into the regression, log liabilities enters
quadratically, and all other groups of variables enter with a quartic, in order to capture the nonlinearity
present in the data. The regressions in the first table are run for 2006 Q1 on the cross-section of banks with
all variables available, the regressions in the second table are run for 2009 Q1 on the cross-section of banks
with all variables available. Data on market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data
are from the FR Y-9C. The delinquent loans ratio is the ratio of loans past due 30 days or more plus loans
in non-accrual, over total loans. Log RoE is defined as log (1 + RoE). RoE over the past year is defined as
book net income over the last four quarters divided by book equity four quarters ago; RoE over the next
year and RoE over the year after next are defined as the one and two year leads of this variable.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Variables on Market Capitalization
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Notes: These figures show results from a cross-sectional regression of log market capitalization on assorted
variables. The top row shows results from a regression of log market capitalization on log book equity and
a quartic in log RoE over the past year. The bottom row shows results from a regression of log market
capitalization on log book equity, a quartic in log RoE over the past year, and a quartic in log RoE over the
next year. The horizontal axis shows the regressor of interest, and the vertical axis shows the outcome minus
the effect of the controls (for the top row, the controls are a constant and log book equity, for the bottom
row, the controls are a constant, log book equity, and a quartic in log RoE over the past year). The left
column shows results for 2006 Q1, the right column shows results for 2009 Q1. Regressions are run on the
cross-section of banks with all variables available, but the horizaontal axis of the graph window is restricted
to ±3 standard deviations from the mean to improve visibility. Data on market capitalization and returns
are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. Log RoE is defined as log (1 + RoE). RoE over
the past year is defined as book net income over the last four quarters divided by book equity four quarters
ago; RoE over the next year is defined as the one year lead of this variable.
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Figure 2.5: Book and Market Leverage of Bank Holding Companies
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Notes: These figures show data on book and marketleverage for BHCs. Book data (book equity and
liabiities) come from the FR Y-9C, and market capitalization data is based on CRSP data. The left panel
shows aggregates from BHC balance sheets (dropping new entrants), and the right panel shows data for
the “Big Four” largest BHCs. Book leverage is computed as assets/book equity, and market leverage is
computed as (liabilities + market capitalization)/market capitalization. The aggregate leverage ratios are
computed as (aggregate liabilities + aggregate equity)/aggregate equity.
Cross-Section of Book Leverage and Regulatory Constraints.
During the crisis, liabilities were relatively flat (Figure 2.1), book equity continued to rise,
and market equity crashed (Figure 2.3). This results in the pattern for leverage in Figure
2.5. Book leverage rose moderately before the crisis and actually fell after the crisis. The
smooth patterns in book leverage were hardly reflective of a major banking crisis. Market
leverage, by contrast, spiked dramatically during the crisis, and remained almost twice as
high compared to its pre-crisis level for at least four years. Given the dramatic rise in
market leverage and the divergence of market and book leverage during the crisis, we next
turn to analyze the extent to which banks faced binding constraints on their leverage. The
aggregate time series results suggest that there was not a binding cap on market leverage,
since market leverage rose dramatically during the crisis. The time series cannot so easily
rule out regulatory constraints on book leverage: book leverage did not rise dramatically,
and regulatory constraints changed over time after the crisis.
To further examine the degree to which regulatory capital constraints did or did not bind
during the crisis, we turn to the cross-section. Even if the constraints did not bind on average,
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they may have been binding for some banks. Under Basel II (the regulatory standard in
place during the crisis), bank holding companies were subject to regulatory minimums on
their total capital ratio and their tier 1 capital ratio. These capital ratios are computed as
Qualifying Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets, and thus a bank with a higher capital ratio has
lower leverage. Basel II required banks hold a minimum tier 1 capital ratio of 4% and a
minimum total capital ratio of 8%. In order to be categorized as “well-capitalized,” banks
had to meet minimum capital ratios that were two percentage points higher (6% and 10%
respectively); being categorized as well-capitalized is helpful because banks that are not
well-capitalized are subject to additional regulatory scrutiny (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 1998; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006). After the crisis, tighter
capital requirements were phased in under Basel III. The minimum total capital ratio stayed
at 8% throughout our sample period, but the Tier 1 capital ratio rose to 4.5% in 2013, 5.5%
in 2014, and finally settled at 6% starting in 2015. Also under Basel III, additional capital
ratios (e.g. tier 1 leverage and common equity capital ratio) began being monitored (however
these ratios are quite similar to the pre-existing tier 1 and total capital ratios), and starting
in 2016, a “capital conservation buffer” and special requirements for systemically important
financial institutions were introduced (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011).
Figure 2.6 shows the share of BHCs close to the regulatory minimum for different capital
ratios. The panels show that although some banks were close to the regulatory minimum,
and this share rose during the crisis, the vast majority of banks were not near the regulatory
constraint. Interestingly, the share rose to its peak in 2010 similar to when loan losses peaked,
suggesting delay in the accounting of losses. Thus, although regulatory constraints may have
been relevant for some banks, they do not bind strictly for most banks, especially since even
banks that are near the regulatory constraint can often avoid activating the constraint by
manipulating their books.
This yields our third fact:
Fact 2.3. Neither regulatory nor market constraints bind strictly for most banks.
Of course, just because the constraint does not bind directly does not mean it could never
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Figure 2.6: Book and Market Leverage of Bank Holding Companies
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Notes: These figures show data on regulatory capital ratios for BHCs from the FR Y-9C. The left panel
shows data on the distribution of the tier 1 capital ratio, and the right panel shows data on the distribution
of the total capital ratio. The figures plot the share of banks whose regulatory capital ratio falls below a
given level, computed using the full, unweighted sample. The regulatory capital requirements are shown on
the graph and described in the text.
bind in the future. For example, banks could choose to keep leverage low in order to avoid
a future shock that causes the constraint to bind. Since a small but non-negligible share of
banks do find themselves below the regulatory minimum during the crisis, and a larger share
find themselves below the threshold to be considered well-capitalized, this is a real concern
for banks. However, since regulatory constraints do not bind for most banks even in the
crisis, and since banks can manipulate their books, a model in which regulatory constraints
binds directly for most banks will not accurately describe bank behavior.
2.2.3 Target Leverage and Adjustment Costs
Once we add leverage adjustment costs (e.g. equity issuance costs and balance sheet stick-
iness) the choice of leverage becomes a dynamic problem. With adjustment costs, banks
will have some long-run “target leverage,” but when they are hit by a shock, they will only
gradually adjust back to the target level. This is in contrast to a simple model without
adjustment costs: without adjustment costs, we would expect immediate adjustment and no
dynamics.
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In order to investigate whether a target leverage level with adjustment costs determines
bank behavior, we explore how banks respond to shocks. We focus on excess-return shocks
as a measure for ex-ante unpredictable return innovations. For the rest of the paper we
refer to these innovations as return shocks. These return shocks can be interpreted as a
linear transformation of default shocks to banks’ assets. We will also use this interpretation
in our model. We will find that the target leverage theory with adjustment costs seems to
describe the data well, and provides insights into potential ways to endogenize the frictions
that banks face, which we will discuss in the next section.
Econometric Specification. We estimate the following panel regressions:
∆ log(yi,t) = αt +
k∑
h=0
βh · log(1 + ri,t−h) + γh · Postt log(1 + ri,t−h) + i,t
where i indexes over banks, t indexes over quarters, ri,t indicates the market return over
the past quarter for bank i in quarter t, αt is a time fixed effect, and Postt is an indicator
variable equal to one if the current quarter is post-crisis (we treat 2007 Q4 as first quarter
for which Postt = 1), and yi,t is the outcome of interest.
1718 Time-fixed effects soak up
aggregate shocks (e.g. changes in the price of loans due to demand shocks) giving us a partial
equilibrium, supply-side impulse response, estimated off of the cross-sectional variation. In
17Since market returns are changes in equity valuations, taking first differences in logs provides a tight
conceptual link between the outcome and the regressor. Using levels would mean that the outcome was
highly correlated with bank size. This would raise concerns about stationarity, and if the market returns of
banks exhibit a size premium then this would also lead to omitted variables bias. Using levels could also
result in a regression that was heavily influenced by a few large banks, given the highly skewed bank size
distribution. For the same reason we do not weight our regressions: the bank size distribution is highly
skewed, and so a weighted regression would be equivalent to a regression with only the handful of largest
banks. If the variance of the residuals were lower for larger banks, then using weights would yield a more
efficient estimator. Empirically however, the variance of the residuals does not appear to vary substantially
by bank size.
18One might favor an alternative specification which includes lags of the dependent variable in addition
to contemporaneous and lagged returns. This faces two issues: Nickell bias and bad control. Including the
dependent variable as a lag will induce bias, as documented by Nickell (1981). Dealing with this bias is
challenging, and may result in poor precision. Perhaps more importantly, the lagged dependent variable is
a "bad control," in that it is endogenous to the regressor. We wish to back out the effect of a return shock
in t− 3 on the change in liabilities in t: if we condition on liabilities in t− 1, which is itself also affected by
the past return shock, then we will not identify our parameter of interest.
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all specifications, we use k = 20. Given the high number of lags, we extend our data to 1990
Q3. This is the first quarter in which we can identify which banks are top-tier BHCs from
the FR Y-9C. This extension is necessary to obtain precise pre-crisis estimates. We cluster
standard errors by bank. Finally, to report the impulse response function, we cumulate the
coefficients: the pre-crisis contemporaneous response is β0, the next period is β0 + β1, and
so on. For post-crisis, we also add the corresponding γ terms.
The choice of market return shocks instead of equity shocks is important for our iden-
tification strategy: market capitalization is a choice variable (banks can affect their equity
by issuing equity or lowering dividends), and is thus endogenous. On the other hand, under
the efficient-markets hypothesis variation in excess returns should be unpredictable ex ante
after adjusting for the risk-premium. This forms the basis of our identification strategy: we
treat cross-sectional variation in returns as unanticipated shocks that perturb bank equity.
For our main results, we employ a risk-adjustment procedure, described in the appendix.
This procedure isolates variation in risk-adjusted returns, and uses this variation to estimate
the impulse response. However, the results for unadjusted returns are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar, and are also reported in the appendix.
Estimated Responses. How do shocks affect banks’ balance sheet, financing, and payout
choices? We estimate impulse response functions for logged stock variables (liabilities, market
capitalization, book equity, and market leverage), as well as for log flows (issuance rates,
common dividend rates, and book return). Results are shown in Figure 2.7 for stocks and in
Figure 2.8 for flows. Importantly, we are showing the response to a negative return shock,
since we find this easier to think about in the context of the financial crisis. The x-axis of our
plots shows the contemporaneous response (−β0 for pre-crisis and −β0 − γ0 for post-crisis)
as quarter 1, the response one quarter later (−β0− β1 and −β0− β1− γ0− γ1) as quarter 2,
and so on.
Responses of stock variables. Suppose banks have a target leverage ratio, we would
expect banks to respond to a negative wealth shock (which mechanically increases leverage)
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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by moving back towards their target leverage. The data is consistent with such an adjustment
in response to return shocks. The data also reveals that this response is slow, suggesting
adjustment costs play an important role. The impulse response of log market leverage,
defined here as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), is simply the difference between the
response of log liabilities and log market capitalization. In the initial quarter, the mechanical
effect on the denominator dominates. Thanks to the great deal of post-crisis adjustment on
the equity side, banks adjusted their market leverage faster in response to cross-sectional
shocks post-crisis than pre-crisis. However, the effect of return shocks on market leverage
does not vanish, even five years out, suggesting adjustment costs are quite important.
This yields our fourth fact:
Fact 2.4. Banks appear to operate with a target leverage ratio to which they only return
slowly after shocks, suggesting adjustment costs.
We can decompose the impulse response of market leverage into the responses of liabilities
and of market capitalization. After a 10% return shock, five years out, there is a decrease of
3-4% in liabilities in the pre-crisis environment and of 2-3% in the post-crisis. Although banks
appear to adjust liabilities more slowly post-crisis, this is reversed for market capitalization.
In the pre-crisis, market equity falls mechanically in response to the shock (a return shock
automatically lowers equity one-for-one), with little further response of equity afterwards.
By contrast, in the post-crisis, five years out, a 10% shock to returns yields only a roughly
5% decrease in market capitalization. These impulse responses show that banks switched
from responding exclusively by decreasing assets and liabilities, in the pre-crisis period to a
combination of balance sheet and equity adjustment in the post-crisis period, with equity
adjustments being more important. When we say equity was the more important margin of
adjustment, we mean that the adjustment of log market equity is larger, which means that
the equity adjustment is more important for adjusting leverage. Of course, if we did not
take logs, the balance sheet response would be larger since banks are highly levered.
This yields our fifth and final fact:
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Fact 2.5. Prior to the crisis, banks adjusted leverage primarily by reducing debt keeping eq-
uity unchanged. Post-crisis, banks also raised equity through retained earnings and issuance.
Finally, our analysis in the previous section suggested that book values respond only
slowly to losses that are reflected quickly in market returns. Thus, book equity (see Figure
2.7) and book returns on equity (see Figure 2.8) should exhibit a delayed response to market
returns. This is exactly what we see in the data.
Response of Flow Variables. We now describe movements in flow variables such as the
dividend rate, the return on book equity (ROE), and equity issuance rate. For flows, we
modify the methodology. We estimate the following equation:
log(1 + yi,t) = αt +
k∑
h=0
βh · log(1 + ri,t−h) + γh · Postt log(1 + ri,t−h) + i,t.
where now yi,t now represents the dividend rate, equity issuance rate, or book returns. Thus,
when we report the impulse responses, rather than tracing out the rate, we are summing up
cumulative deviations from the mean.19
According to the pecking-order theory ((Myers and Majluf 1984)), internal equity fi-
nancing (retaining earnings by reducing dividends) should be cheaper than outside equity
finance and thus be preferred by banks. The data does not provide clear evidence for this
theory. The cumulative response of the common dividend rate to a negative return shock is
small and actually positive pre-crisis20 and the issuance rate response is small and negative.
During the pre-crisis banks chose to not recapitalize, consistent with the response in market
leverage in Figure 2.7. During the post-crisis periods, banks recapitalized by both reducing
19We do this because for flows we are interested in how the flows cumulate over time to affect the stocks:
elevated issuance rates cumulate to an increase in equity, book returns cumulate to a change in book equity,
etc. In practice this is also useful econometrically: we are able to get precise estimates when we plot the
cumulative response of these flow variables, while attempting to trace out the path of the flows gives us
estimates that are mostly noise. Moreover, since our flow variables do not depend on the size of the bank,
there is no need to take first differences as we do for the stock variables.
20Some of this effect may be mechanical: dividend per share tends to be fixed, and so a return shock leading
to a fall in market capitalization will automatically raise the dividend rate, and this effect will cumulate until
the dividend per share is newly set.
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
lo
g(1
 + 
Co
mm
on
 D
ivi
de
nd
 R
ate
)
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
Pre−Crisis Post−Crisis
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
lo
g(1
 + 
Iss
ua
nc
e R
ate
)
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
Pre−Crisis Post−Crisis
−
.
8
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
lo
g(1
 + 
Bo
ok
 R
etu
rns
)
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
Pre−Crisis Post−Crisis
Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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dividends21 and increasing issuances. Most importantly, the cumulative response of issuance
rates is much larger than that of dividend rates: the post-crisis response of issuance rates is
three times the magnitude of the dividend rate response. In other words, when shocks were
large and profits low, recapitalization via retained earnings would have taken a lot of time.
Identification Discussion and Robustness. There are a few threats to identification.
Returns in a given period may be correlated with other variables ex-post — e.g., banks with
higher exposure to subprime mortgages should suffer heavier losses during the crisis. This
means that returns in one period may be correlated with returns in another period ex post.
This correlation will cause omitted variables bias if the outcome variable is affected by returns
in both periods, but one of the periods is excluded. To deal with this issue, we include twenty
lags of market returns. We also implement a placebo test where we add leading values of
returns into the specification —future return shocks should not affect the present, otherwise
they aren’t exogenous “shocks”. Our placebo tests, shown in the appendix, suggest that the
bias in our estimates is small.
Our estimates could also be polluted by omitted variables bias from other sources. Cross-
sectional return shocks might incorporate idiosyncratic information not just about a bank’s
present portfolio (e.g. the default rate of mortgages on Citi’s balance sheet will rise relative
to those of other banks) but also about the relative profitability of its future portfolio (e.g.
the default rate on the mortgages that Citi will issue in the future will rise relative to those
of other banks) and thus affect the bank’s problem through channels other than perturbing
equity (if expected returns on future assets fall, then it could make sense to lower leverage).
We do not think this problem is severe since we think most banks have access to fairly
similar assets and thus the idiosyncratic element of shocks is mainly a function of the present
portfolio (since we control for time fixed effects, our estimates are identified only off of the
idiosyncratic component of the shocks). Our estimates could also be biased to the extent
21Some of this may be regulatory: undercapitalized banks are not allowed to distribute dividends.
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that the efficient markets hypothesis does not hold perfectly.22 We acknowledge that our
identification strategy is imperfect, but we think these issues are not crucial. Since it is
infeasible for us to run a randomized controlled trial, we believe our approach provides
valuable information about the dynamic behavior of banks before and after the crisis.
2.2.4 Interpretation of the Facts
These facts can be microfounded with common bank accounting practices and capital real-
location costs.
Bank Accounting Practices. The discrepancy between book and market equity reflects
bank accounting practices. Banks can delay acknowledging losses on their books (e.g. Laux
and Leuz 2010), because banks are not required to mark-to-market the majority of their as-
sets. There are many incentives to delay book losses. In practice, a key metric for measuring
success of a bank is the book return on equity (ROE).23 Given that ROE is a measure of
success, manager compensation is linked to book value performance. Moreover, shareholders
and other stakeholders may base their valuations on information from book data. Finally,
banks are required to meet capital standards based on book values (if Citi had acknowledged
a 90% loss of equity on the books, it would have been severely undercapitalized).
Banks’ ability to “massage” their accounts is studied extensively in the accounting lit-
erature (Bushman (2016) and Acharya and Ryan (2016) review the literature on this issue,
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) studies the same issue for non-financial firms). In prac-
tice, banks can record securities on the books using two methodologies: either amortized
historical cost (the security is worth what it cost the bank to buy it with appropriate amor-
22The main concern here would be that the shocks were actually anticipated, perhaps because banks have
access to information that doesn’t reach the market until later. This would lead to pre-shock trends, which
our placebo test is designed to test for. Our placebo tests find that any such bias is small.
23For example, JP Morgan’s 2016 annual report states “the Firm will continue to establish internal ROE
targets for its business segments, against which they will be measured” (on page 83 of the report).
50
tization) or fair value accounting.24 In addition to mis-pricing securities, another degree of
freedom is the extent to which banks can acknowledge impairments: banks have the right to
delay acknowledging impairments on assets held at historical cost, if they deem those impair-
ments as temporary (i.e. they believe the asset will return to its previous price). This gives
banks substantial leeway, and led banks to overvalue assets on the books during the crisis.
Huizinga and Laeven (2012) find that banks used discretion to hold real-estate related assets
at values higher than their market value. (Laux and Leuz 2010) note some notable cases
of inflated books during the crisis: Merrill Lynch sold $30.6 billion dollars of CDOs for 22
cents on the dollar while the book value was 65 percent higher than its sale price. Similarly,
Lehman Brothers wrote down its portfolio of commercial MBS by only three percent, even
when an index of commercial MBS was falling by ten percent in the first quarter of 2008.
Laux and Leuz 2010 also document substantial underestimation of loan losses in comparison
to external estimates.
This shows up in our own analysis as well: Figure 2.2 shows that provisions for loan losses
and net charge-offs only reached their peak in 2009 and 2010 respectively, and remained quite
elevated at least through 2011, well after the recession had ended. The decomposition of net
charge-offs shows that these losses were heavily driven by real estate, suggesting they were
associated with the housing crisis.25 Banks’ books were only acknowledging in 2011 losses
24Fair value accounting can be done at three levels: Level 1 accounting uses quoted prices in active markets.
Level 2 uses prices of similar assets as a benchmark to value assets that trade infrequently. Level 3 is based
on models that do not involve market prices (e.g. a discounted cash flow model). Banks are required to use
the lowest level possible for each asset. In practice, most assets are recorded at historical cost. The majority
of fair value measurements are Level 2 (Goh et al. 2015; Laux and Leuz 2010). Recent work has shown that
the stock market values fair value assets less if they are measured using a higher level of fair value accounting.
This leaves room to mis-price assets on books. Particularly during 2008, Level 2 and Level 3 measures of
assets were valued substantially below one (Goh et al. 2015; Kolev 2009; Song, Thomas, and Yi 2010). Laux
and Leuz (2010) document sizable reclassifications from Levels 1 and 2 to Level 3 during this period. They
highlight the case of Citigroup, which moved $53 billion into Level 3 between the fourth quarter of 2007 and
the first quarter of 2008 and reclassified $60 billion in securities as held-to-maturity which enabled Citi to
use historical costs.
25When a bank has a loss that is estimable and probable, it first provisions for loan losses, which shows
up as PLL. Later when the loss occurs, the asset is charged off and thus taken off the books, which shows
up as charge-offs, although occasionally the bank can recover the asset later. Net charge-offs is charge-offs
minus recoveries. We show a decomposition by category for net charge-offs but not for PLL because the FR
Y-9C does not provide information on PLL by loan category.
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that the market had already predicted when the crisis hit.
Harris, Khan, and Nissim (2013) construct an index, based on information available in the
given time period, that predicts future losses substantially better than the allowance for loan
losses.26 This implies that the allowance for loan losses is not capturing all of the available
information to estimate losses. This may in part be strategic manipulation, but there may
also be a required delay in acknowledging loan losses. Under the “incurred loss model” that
was the regulatory standard during the crisis, banks are only allowed to provision for loan
losses when a loss is “estimable and probable” (Harris, Khan, and Nissim 2013). Thus, even
if banks know that many of their loans will eventually suffer losses, they were not supposed
to update their books until the loss was imminent.
Thus, any theory of regulatory constraints on bank leverage should “account for ac-
counting.” Bank accounting rules enable banks to delay acknowledging losses and avoid
the regulatory constraint. Some existing work has begun to do this: Milbradt (2012) ana-
lyzes the distorted incentives brought about by Level 3 fair-value accounting, and Caballero,
Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) note that regulatory constraints may be one factor contribut-
ing to evergreening during Japan’s stagnation, because evergreening allows banks to delay
acknowledging losses on the books.
Capital Reallocation Costs. The data is consistent with banks targeting a leverage level
and facing adjustment costs. We now examine what form these adjustment costs might take
and what margin they operate along. We need adjustment costs on both liabilities and
equity to explain the slow adjustment of leverage.27 Without adjustment costs, banks could
simply expand or shrink assets and liabilites to meet the target leverage ratio. Without
equity adjustment costs, banks could simply expand or shrink equity to the desired level.
Adjustment costs can come in the form of illiquid assets or illiquid liabilities. Asset illiq-
26The ALL is the stock variable corresponding to the PLL.
27This assumes that the bank’s problem is homothetic. Delevering by raising equity will increase size and
delevering by shrinking assets and liabilities will lower size. Thus, non-homotheticity could serve the role of
an adjustment cost, and the bank would have both a target leverage and a target size.
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uidity could arise for a number of reasons, such as relational capital, bank specific expertise,
asymmetric information, or the incentives to avoid acknowledging book losses on the books.
We will discuss some of these in more detail in the next section. Liabilities can also be
illiquid: in particular, banks could only have long term assets like deposits that are costly
to terminate early (turning away depositors could be harmful if the bank wants to promote
depositor loyalty for the future, and in many cases it is impossible to terminate these liabil-
ities early). We can examine this issue empirically by looking at the composition of bank
liabilities in the cross-section.
In Figure 2.9, we present kernel density estimates of the distribution of deposits (notori-
ously sticky) as a share of total liabilities, and of the sum of repurchase agreements (Repo)
and federal funds purchased (Fed Funds) as a share of total liabilities. We think of Repo
and Fed Funds as liquid liabilities because they mature very quickly, i.e., mostly overnight.
The figures show that, both before and after the crisis, most banks had some Repo on their
balance sheet and not all of their liabilities were deposits. This is particularly true for the
larger banks that drive aggregate leverage. This suggests that banks indeed had room to
pay off their liquid liabilities, so liquid liabilities were probably not a crucial friction for most
banks.
Equity adjustment costs can come on the issuance or dividend margin.28 For issuances,
agency theories suggest that banks pay a premium on equity issuances due to asymmetric
information. Yet, in the post-crisis, banks actually responded to negative shocks mainly
with increased issuances rather than with lowering dividends. This may be in part because
dividends are constrained to be non-negative, and many banks were up against the zero
dividends constraint. To investigate this further, the left panel of Figure 2.10 shows kernel
density estimates of the distribution of common dividend rates.
The kernel density estimates and accompanying summary statistics indicate that a divi-
28Of course, the path of bank equity also depends on profits. However, since in our framework equity
is measured as market capitalization and thus profits are measured as market returns, the efficient market
hypothesis tells us that, setting aside the issue of risk adjustment, there should be no effect of past variables
on market profits.
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dend rate of zero is common, and became more common during the crisis. The right panel
shows a new impulse response function for the common dividend rate estimated via a Tobit
model with left censoring of dividend at zero. The alternative estimate suggests that the
cumulative response of post-crisis common dividend rates to return shocks would have been
much larger had dividends not been constrained by zero. Whether this constraint is sufficient
to fully explain the disparity between the response of dividends and issuances is unclear: the
Tobit model imposes a particular assumption about the censoring process (e.g. the error
term is normally distributed), and it is also not obvious how issuances would have behaved
if dividends had not been constrained. We do not attempt to develop a full structural model
of bank behavior in this paper. However, it is clear that the requirement that dividends be
non-negative is an important constraint.
2.3 Conclusion
This paper summarizes five empirical facts about the behavior of banks during the US the
financial crisis of 2008. We use these facts to explore what features banking models need
in order to get closer to the data. Our empirical findings suggest a theory wherein banks
target market leverage, but where adjustments to that target are gradual due to adjustment
costs. A comparison between pre- and post-crisis responses suggest that, in contrast to the
pre-crisis period, in the post-crisis banks relied more on retained earnings than on assets
sales to readjust market leverage back to target.
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2.4 Additional Figures
Figure 2.9: Liquidity of Deposits for Bank Holding Companies
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Notes: These figures show kernel density estimates of liability composition ratios for BHCs. Data are from
the FR Y-9C. We use 2006 Q1, 2009 Q1, and 2012 Q1 as reference quarters, and restrict to banks that are
present in the data in all three reference quarters, in order to ensure comparability. The top panels show
deposits as a share of total liabilities, and the bottom panels show repo (securities sold under agreement
to repurchase) plus federal funds purchased as a share of total liabilities. The left panels are unweighted
estimates, and the right panels are weighted by the total liabilities of the bank. The bottom panels are
trimmed at 0.3 in order to improve legibility.
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Figure 2.10: The Effects of the Zero Lower Bound for Common Dividends
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Notes: The left panel shows kernel density estimates of common dividend rates (with book equity as the
denominator) for BHCs. Data are from the FR Y-9C. We use 2006 Q1, 2009 Q1, and 2012 Q1 as reference
quarters, and restrict to banks that are present in the data in all three reference quarters, in order to
ensure comparability. The panel is trimmed at 0.5 in order to improve legibility. The right panel shows
the estimated impulse response of log common dividends to a one unit negative returns shock. The impulse
response is estimated using a Tobit model with left censoring at zero. Data on market capitalization and
returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. The logged
common dividend rate for the right panel is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization),
to maintain consistency with the rest of the impulse response section.
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2.4.1 Risk Adjustment Procedure
For our main impulse response results, we wish to use risk-adjusted returns, rather than raw
returns. More formally, we assume that the market returns of bank i at time t are given by
rit − rft = αi + βi
(
rmt − rft
)
+ ηit
where rft is the risk free-rate (which we measure using the rate on 3-Month Treasuries),
rmt is the market return (which we measure as the value-weighted return, including dividends,
on the S&P 500), and rit is the market return of bank i at time t. All returns are logged,
e.g. rmt refers to log (1 + Market Return). We wish to isolate variation in the idiosynratic
shocks, ηit, and use this variation to estimate the impulse responses.
A natural, but naive, approach would be to estimate the above model for each bank
i using OLS, and then use the estimated residuals, ηˆit, as the regressors in the impulse
response estimation. The problem here is that it induces bias: ηˆit is a noisy measure of the
true regressor ηit, which leads to bias as long as T is finite (the bias will shrink as T grows
large, because ηˆit will converge to the true ηit).
Fortunately, there is a simple solution: we estimate ηˆit using OLS, and then we use ηˆit
as an instrument for the unadjusted return. Since our main regressions use contempora-
neous returns, twenty lags, and their interaction with a post-crisis dummy, this means we
use contemporaneous ηˆit, twenty lags of ηˆit, and their interaction with a post-crisis dummy
as instruments. Instrumental variables does not suffer from the same problem of bias un-
der classical measurement error. Instead, to get identification under the assumed model for
returns, we need our instrument to be correlated with the “good variation”, ηit, and un-
correlated with the “bad variation,” αi + βi
(
rmt − rft
)
. This is mechanically what we are
doing when we run OLS at the bank level, and if the assumed model for returns is correct,
then we have E
[
ηˆit
(
αi + βi
(
rmt − rft
))]
= αiE [ηˆit] + βiE
[
ηˆit
(
rmt − rft
)]
= 0 + 0. Thus,
our instrumental variables strategy will give us a consistent estimator of the true impulse
response, under the assumption that we have the correct model of returns. Since the OLS
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regression estimating ηˆit is conducted at the bank level, we cluster our standard errors at
the bank level (clustering at the bank level is already a good idea).
2.4.2 Results without Risk Adjustment
While we favor the risk-adjusted results, we also have computed “unadjusted results” for
the impulse responses, which we report here for completeness. We also have computed
unadjusted results which control for bank fixed effects. The results with bank fixed effects
are a middle ground between unadjusted and adjusted results: they allow for heterogeneity
in αi (this gets absorbed by the bank fixed effect), but not in βi (the time fixed effect
will absorb rft + β
(
rmt − rft
)
, with a homogeneous β, but will not deal with heterogeneous
βi). The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar across the methods. However,
compared to the other methods, the bank fixed effect method yields a slower response of
liabilities in the pre-crisis. As a result, the results from the bank fixed effect method find
responses of liabilities pre-crisis vs. post-crisis that are not meaningfully different from each
other. Nonetheless, since two out of three methods find a larger response of liabilities pre-
crisis than post-crisis, since we favor the risk-adjusted results for a priori reasons, and given
the non-negligible standard errors on the pre-crisis response, we prefer the interpretation
that the pre-crisis response of liabilities is larger than the post-crisis response.
2.4.3 Placebo Tests
To test the validity of our identification strategy, we conduct placebo tests where we include
ten leads of returns (in addition to the contemporary value and twenty lags as before). If
the returns really are unanticipated shocks, then the leading values should not affect current
behavior. This is similar to testing for pre-trends: we are testing whether the banks that
will experience higher returns in the future are already acting differently today. Overal, the
placebo test are encouraging, and suggest that our results are not driven by prior differences
in the behavior of banks which experience return shocks.
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Figure 2.11: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables (No Risk Adjustment)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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Figure 2.12: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables (No Risk Adjustment)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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Figure 2.13: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables (Bank Fixed Effects)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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Figure 2.14: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables (Bank Fixed Effects)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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Figure 2.15: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables (Risk-Adjusted, with Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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Figure 2.16: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables (Risk-Adjusted, with Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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Figure 2.17: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables (No Risk Adjustment, with
Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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Figure 2.18: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables (No Risk Adjustment, with
Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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Figure 2.19: Estimated Impulse Responses for Stock Variables (Bank Fixed Effects, with
Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the esti-
mated impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on
market capitalization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The pan-
els display the impulse responses of log liabilities, log market capitalization, log market leverage, and
log book equity. Market leverage is defined as log(Liabilities/Market Capitalization), so that it repre-
sents the difference between the response of log liabilities and log market capitalization (results using
log(Liabilities + Market Capitalization)/Market Capitalization) are extremely similar).
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Figure 2.20: Estimated Impulse Responses for Flow Variables (Bank Fixed Effects, with
Placebo)
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Notes: These figures show estimated impulse response functions for BHCs. The figures show the estimated
impulse response to a one unit negative returns shock. Dashed lines denote the 95% confidence interval.
Standard errors are clustered by bank. The “post-crisis” period begins in 2007 Q4. Data on market cap-
italization and returns are from CRSP, and all other data are from the FR Y-9C. The panels display the
impulse responses of the common dividend rate, equity issuance rate, and book returns. The logged com-
mon dividend rate is defined as log(1 + Common Dividends/Market Capitalization), the logged issuance
rate is defined as log(1 + Equity Issuances/Market Capitalization), and logged book returns are defined as
log(1 + Book Net Income/Book Equity Last Quarter).
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CHAPTER 3
Modelling Banks Adjustment
3.1 Introduction
The data presented in Chapter 2 implies that bank models should incorporate (1) meaning-
ful differences between book accounting and market values, (2) a target for market-based
leverage, (3) a slow adjustment to the market-leverage target, (4) a rich cross-section of book
and market leverage ratios, and (5) time variation in frictions. In this chapter we present
a partial-equilibrium model of banks with these features. The model is admittedly reduced
form, but tractable and consistent with the restrictions placed by the data. If a model
with proper microfoundations can deliver similar portfolio tradeoffs, its mechanics are likely
consistent with the data.
The model works as follows. As in O’Hara (1983), banks want to smooth dividends.
The model distinguishes between book and market value of assets, because banks can (as
in the data) choose to delay acknowledging losses. This drives the differences between the
book and market value of equity. Banks face both book (regulatory) and market leverage
constraints. If they violate either constraint banks are liquidated. Because loans are exposed
to idiosyncratic default shocks, banks cannot control their leverage perfectly. When banks
sell loans rather than keeping them on their balance sheet until they mature, they have
to sell then at a discount (as in Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Since cutting back dividends
is costly, these frictions produce a target for market leverage. Furthermore, they cause
leverage to slowly revert back to the target if it starts off target. We calibrate some model
parameters and estimate the both the cost of selling assets pre-crisis and post-crisis. The
simulated model generates moments that are consistent with the five facts. The estimation
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finds higher adjustment costs post crisis.
The model allows us to decompose market leverage into cash flow fundamentals (low
dividend rate) captured by book values, cash flow fundamentals not captured by book values
(delayed loan losses), and market discount rates.1
Although the model does not feature microfoundations for the components that slow
down the balance sheet adjustments, it produces patterns that can help us distinguish be-
tween alternative microfoundations. We can find those microfoundations in some studies.
We argue that a recent wave of banking models should bring those microfoundations into
macroeconomic models with banks. An example of a model with where banks have account-
ing flexibility is Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008). That paper argues that in the early
nineties, Japanese banks avoided the recognition of loan losses by rolling-over loans that
would have otherwise defaulted. This phenomenon is called evergreening and was possibly
also important in the recent crisis in the US. Another microfoundation for book-market
accounting differences is found in Milbradt (2012). In this model banks do not trade as-
sets after their price falls below their purchase price to avoid recognizing losses that reduce
their regulatory capital. Many corporate finance models produce a target for leverage that
emerges from a trade-off theory—see for example, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Myers
(1984), Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Frank and Goyal (2011). Some recent work has
provided further micro-foundations for slow reversals of leverage. In DeMarzo and He (2016)
and Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016), a slow adjustment to a leverage target is produced
by a combination of long-term debt, default, and lack of commitment to a debt policy. Those
models could be adapted to account for deposit insurance and implicit government subsi-
dies. Equity issuance costs are rationalized by agency frictions, like for example in Myers
(1977, a debt overhang model) and Myers and Majluf (1984, a private information model).2
Fact 4 also suggests that the costly liquidation of bank assets is an important feature of
1Atkeson et al. (2018) decompose banks’ market to book ratio of equity to draw conclusions about changes
in banks’ government guarantees.
2In the midst of the crisis, Acharya et al. (2010) argues that banks receiving capital infussions where
deliberately paying dividends to shareholders.
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the problem faced by banks. Adjustment costs on asset sales arise naturally when banks
hold information sensitive assets, typically viewed as a specialty of banks (e.g. Leland and
Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984a), Williamson (1986), Tirole (2011), and Dang et al. (2017)).3
Another interpretation is that this reflects an aggravated cost of selling assets (as conceived
in Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Fact 4 is suggestive that asset liquidations became more costly
during the crisis. Gorton and Ordonez (2011) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2010)
are both models where assets become more illiquid during crises due to adverse selection.4
In a related paper, Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Shin (2016) take a long-run perspective also
to discuss which theories of financial intermediation are supported by the data. Consistent
with their analysis, our model captures that book-leverage matters because losses cannot be
delayed forever.
Section 3.2 presents the model and Section 3.3 concludes.
3.2 A Model to Rationalize the Facts
We now present a model that rationalizes the five facts described earlier. The goal is to
produce a reduced-form partial equilibrium model that illustrates the main features that
a quantitative general equilibrium model would need to match these facts. Though many
of the model’s features are ad-hoc, the features point toward deeper theories that could
microfound them.
3.2.1 The Model
We study a collection of heterogeneous banks in partial equilibrium. That is, banks take loan
and deposit rates as given. From the solution to banks’ optimization problem, we simulate
3This was the topic of Darrell Duffie’s presidential address to the American Finance Society in 2010
(Duffie 2010).
4In Gorton and Ordonez (2011) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2010) the equity of constrained
agents determines their incentives to acquire information: Thus, equity losses may trigger adverse selection
because the economy swings from states where information is symmetric and assets are liquid to states where
information is asymmetric and assets illiquid.
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a panel series of banks that we compare to the cross-sectional data.
Environment. Time is discrete, infinite, and indexed by t. The only source of risk
is loan default risk. The bank maximizes the expected discounted value of dividends divt.
Banks have preferences over dividends defined recursively by:
ut = U (divt) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1 (ut+1)
])
where:
U (dt) =
div1−θt
1− θ and CEt [vt+1] =
(
Et
[
v1−ψt+1
]) 1
1−ψ
.
The term divt denotes dividend payouts at time t and u is an Epstein-Zin utility function
with a risk aversion coefficient of ψ and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1/θ. We
introduce curvature to the bank’s objective function for two reasons: (a) to deliver dividend
smoothing, and (b) to study the degree of risk-aversion needed to match the data.
State Variables.We distinguish between economic values and accounting values. At t,
a bank holds stocks of outstanding loans `t and liabilities (deposits) dt. The economic (or
real) value of loans is denoted by `t, and the accounting (or book) value of loans is denoted
by ¯`t. Whereas the economic value is a state variable that captures the future actual income
stream,the accounting value equals the face value of loans owed to the bank. The distinction
appears because some loans default, but this information is not captured in the accounting
value of the books automatically. However, the bank’s actions are affected by both, the
economic and accouting values. The real value of loans, is not the market value, because
loans are not sold at that price. However, the market valuation of loans, and therefore equity,
is based of the real value of loans. We introduce this distinction in order to speak to Facts
1 through 3, because we assume that markets observe `t, while an econometrician that uses
bank regulatory data observes only ¯`t. We can however, interpret return shocks as conveying
information about `t.
Loans are long term and mature at rate δ. Long-term debt is necessary to produce slow-
moving leverage. Loans are also risky. In particular, every period, a fraction 1− ε of loans
72
default. The distribution of ε has a c.d.f. F (ε). The stock of loans `t is the stock net of
defaults. The stock of book loans, ¯`t, is similar but does not account for losses.
5 The laws
of motion for `t and ¯`t are linked but not identical, as we show below. The state variables
for a bank are the triplet
{
`t, dt, ¯`t
}
.
Loan creation. The loan market is simplified to keep the model tractable. Each period,
a bank chooses a flow of new loans, It. Banks fund new loans It by issuing deposits. Banks
issue new deposits at the price p (It, `t, dt) given by:
p (It, `t, dt) = 1 + γIt/ (`t − dt) .
Since `t − dt is the bank’s (real) equity, the price of deposits depends on the ratio of newly
issued loans relative to equity. This functional form introduces quadratic adjustment costs
to the bank’s portfolio. As the bank issues more loans relative to its equity, it issues more
liabilities. Likewise, as it sells more loans, it receives a lower price.6 The combination of
an adjustment cost and long-term loans will induce slow-moving leverage. We assume that
banks cannot issue new equity, so we focus on the dividend or asset sales margin when we
discuss the connection to Facts 4 and 5. Every period, banks choose how much to payout
div and how many loans to issue I.
Laws of motion. From now on, we represent the problem recursively. We denote by
x′ the variables chosen at the end of period t. The law of motion for the real (the economic
value) of loans is:
`′ = (1− δ) `+ I. (3.1)
The bank enters the period with a pre-determined amount of loans `. Over the period, a
5This is a novel feature of our model and critical to capture banks’ ability to engage in evergreening
and to avoid the recognition of losses immediately (see empirical evidence in Blattner, Farinha, and Rebelo
(2017)). Evergreening as discribed in Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) occurs when banks roll over
a loan that won’t be paid. The objective is to avoid registering losses. Since rolling over a loan does not
require new funds, evergreening allows the bank to reduce it’s accounting equity without a cost.
6These costs reflect the notion that banks specialize in assets that have asymmetric information problems
between borrowers and lenders (e.g. Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984b), and Dang et al. (2017)).
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fraction δ matures and new loans I are added. Note that `′ is not necessarily the same as ` at
the beginning of t+1 because the bank cannot condition its choice of `′ on the default shock.
Between the end of period t and t+ 1, loans receive a default shock and only a fraction ε of
loans survive. Therefore, by the beginning of next period the bank inherits ε`′ loans. This
term will be captured in the value function.
The law of motion for deposits is:
d′ =
(
1 + rd
)
d− (r` + δ) `+ p (I, `, d) I + div, (3.2)
where r` denotes the loans rate that applies to alloutstanding loans, and rd denotes interest
on deposits. When loans mature, the bank receives the repayment value of matured loans
in deposits δ`. New loans cost p (I, `, d) deposits per unit of new loan I.
The law of motion for loans on books is:
¯`′ = (1− δ) ¯`+ I (3.3)
The idea behind this law of motion is that the book value of loans does not recognize losses
immediately and therefore it follows the same law of motion as the market value of loans
`, but with ε = 1. Although, in the model losses are never accounted, they are partially
recognized in the sense that deposits do not evolve as book loans would predict. Deposits
move only based on the repayment of the real value of loans.
Regulation. The book value of loans is subject to a regulatory constraint. We model
capital requirements as d′ ≤ κ (φ¯`′ − d′) .7 Here, κ is a capital requirement coefficient and
φ a risk-weight on loans. This formulation allows banks to adjust their portfolio at the
beginning of the period. It also implies that some banks would violate the constraint if the
constraint were written in loan terms. We define ρ ≡ φκ/ (1 + κ) and rewrite the constraint
7We can ealso express the constraint in terms of equity capital.
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as:
d′ ≤ ρ¯`′. (3.4)
Bank Liquidation. A bank is shut down for two reasons: If the bank enters a period
with leverage above λ¯, the bank is liquidated. We interpret this as a market-based liquidation.
Second, regulatory liquidiation occurs when there are no values of (div, I) such that the
regulatory capital constraint can be satisfied. Notice that a bank is subject to random
default shocks, and due to the adjustment costs, it cannot control the market value of
its loans at the beginning of the following period. An important observation is that the
regulatory constraint operates on the bank’s control variables, and not on its states—the
bank bank choose (div, I) to avoid violating the constraint. Thus, with a default shock, the
bank has time to adjust its books after a shock to avoid violating the constraint. This is not
true about the market-based constraint, that applies to the bank’s state variables, at the
beginning of the period.
We define liquidation sets. Let Γr be the set of states of regulatory defaults, i.e. the states{
`, d, ¯`
}
such that d′ > ρ¯`′ for every {div, I}. Let Γm be the states where `/ (`− d) > λ¯.
The full set of liquidation states is Γ = Γm ∪ Γr. If the bank enters either liquidation state,
the value of the bank is set to zero.
The bank’s policy functions are the solutions to the following profit-maximization prob-
lem:
V
(
`, d, ¯`
)
= max
{div,I}
U (div) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V
(
ε`′, d′, ¯`′
))])
subject to: (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) and V
(
`, d, ¯`
)
= 0 if
{
`, d, ¯`
} ∈ Γ.
3.2.2 Analysis
We show that the model is scale invariant. We define three useful objects. The first is the
real value of bank equity, W ≡ `− d, the state variable used by markets to price and give a
market value for the bank. The second is real leverage: λ ≡ `/W . The third is the ratio of
the real to book value of loans: q ≡ `/¯`. One proposition summarizes the main result:
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Proposition 3.1. Given {λ, q} the value function is homothethic in wealth W :
V
(
`, d, ¯`
)
= V¯ (λ, q)W 1−θ
where div = cW and I = ι`, and
{
V¯ , ι, c
}
solve the following Bellman equation:
V¯ (λ, q) = max
{c,ι}
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε) , εq
′
)
Ω (ε)1−θ
)])
(3.5)
subject to:
(a) the law of motion for leverage:
λ′ =
1− δ + ι
Ω (1)
λ, (3.6)
(b) the law of motion for the market to book ratio of loans:
q′ =
1− δ + ι
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
,
(c) the portfolio return:
Ω (ε) ≡ [ε (1− δ) + δ + r`]λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− (1− ε) ιλ− γ (ιλ)2 , (3.7)
(d) the regulatory constraint:
1
λ′
≥ 1− ρ
q′
for q′ ≥ ρ, (3.8)
(e) liquidation states:
V¯ (λ, q) = 0 if (λ, q) ∈ Γ, (3.9)
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and the default region defined in terms of (λ, q) is:
Γ ≡
{
(λ, q) : λ > λ¯ ∪ (1− ρ)2 + 4γ
{[
ρ (1− δ) 1
q
+ δ + r`
]
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)} < 0} .
A proof is contained in the Appendix. The proposition merits discussion. First, we factor
out bank equity from the objective and transform the problem into a scale-free problem. The
normalized problem has two state variables: λ = `/W (real leverage), and q = `/¯` (the Tobin
q for loans). The Bellman equation V¯ (λ, q) is a standard consumption-portfolio problem
augmented with regulatory and market-solvency constraints, and a price impact for selling
or buying loans. Constraints (a) and (b) are the laws of motion for the state variables.
Equation (c) is the gross return on real equity of the bank, and is composed of three terms:
ε (1− δ) + δ+ r` is the gross return on loans, and multiplied by λ gives the return on assets
per unit of equity; 1 + rd is the gross cost of deposits, and multiplied by λ − 1 gives the
cost of deposits per unit of equity; and c + (1− ε) ιλ + γ (ιλ)2 are the payouts of the bank
per unit of equity in the form of dividends and adjustment costs. The inequality (d) and
the condition in (e) are the reguldatory constraint and liquidation values re-written in terms
of the states {λ, q}. Once the normalized problem is solved, we recover the original policy
functions and laws of motion.
Model Properties. The model allows us to reproduce Facts 1 through 5. The price
impact on the value of loans implies that banks cannot adjust their portfolio immediately.
Leverage λ is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it enhances returns—this is captured
by equation (3.7) since leverage increases Ω (ε). On the other hand, leverage exposes the
bank to the risk of liquidation. Given a choice of λ′, a bad draw of ε increases leverage at
the beginning of next period. Moreover, the default set Γ (λ, q) is increasing in λ. Higher
leverage makes it more likely to violate the market leverage consraint λ¯. It also tightens the
regulatory constraint—Figure 3.1, left panel.
Even if a single shock does not force liquidation, leverage cannot be adjusted automati-
cally, so a series of negative shocks will induce greater leverage and lead to liquidation. The
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combination of a concave objective and the risk of default leads to a target level for leverage.
Regulatory constraints enter the problem in a novel way. In the constraint in equation
(3.8), the coefficient ρ < 1 makes the constraint set convex and generates a trade-off between
dividend payouts and growth in loans. The constraint is tighter the greater q. The right
panel of Figure 3.1 shows the regulatory constraint in the (λ′, q′) space:
Figure 3.1: Default and Constraint Sets.
(a) Default Set (red)
(b) Regulatory Constraint Set (green)
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3.2.3 Model Implied Return Shocks and Impulse Responses
We now construct a pricing equation for bank stocks and map the underlying default shocks
to a return shock. The goal is to produce the model analogue to the impulse responses to
return shocks. Consider a representative outside investor with a constant discount factor µ.
We abstract from aggregate shocks and shocks to risk premia. We assume that the investor
observes ε. Hence, information about ε is contained in market prices, but not in book values.
The investor values a share of bank stock according to:
S
(
`, d, ¯`
)
= div + µE
[
S
(
ε`′, d′, ¯`′
)]
.
Now, this value function can also be written recursively:
S
(
`, d, ¯`
) ≡ s (λ, q)W = cW + µE [s (λ′, q′) Ω (ε)]W.
We interpret S
(
`, d, ¯`
)
as the market capitalization of a bank. The expected return on bank
shares can be defined as:
R¯ ≡ (div + E [S (ε`′, d′, ¯`′)]) /S (`, d, ¯`) = (c+ E [s (λ′, q′) Ω (ε)]) /s (λ, q) .
Realized returns for a given bank are given by:
R (ε) = (c+ s (λ′, q′) Ω (ε)) /s (λ, q) .
The model analogue to the return shocks in Section (2.2) is then given by:
∆R (ε) = R (ε)− R¯ = (s (λ′, q′) Ω (ε)− E [s (λ′, q′) Ω (ε)]) /s (λ, q) .
which is a mean-zero random variable by construction. In the following section, we report the
impulse responses of bank variables to changes in ∆R (ε′). These are precisely the analogue
of the impulse responses in Chapter 2. Before we get to that, we present the calibration and
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estimation of the parameters.
3.2.4 Calibration and Estimation
Calibration. We match the model to quarterly data. The parameters
{
θ, ψ, β, µ, r`, rd, δ, λ¯, φ, κ
}
are calibrated.
The values of all parameters are listed in Table 3.1. The returns on bank assets r` and
bank liabilities rd are respectively set to 1.5% and 1.0% to yield corresponding annualized
returns of 6% and 4%.
We set the capital constraint to κ = 9 to have a capital requirement ratio in line with
Basel III. We set φ = 0.85 to fit the risk-weights of loans, also in line with Basel III.8 We set
δ to 4.5% to obtain an average loan maturity of 5 years.
The rest of calibrated parameters is chosen to produce target moments. We set the risk-
aversion coefficient ψ to zero because higher levels of risk aversion produce lower leverage
rates. The model already falls short of the market leverage of the data. We set the inverse
IES θ = 1 to obtain an elasticity of dividends to expected returns of 1. We calibrate β to
0.99 to get as close as possible to the dividend rate in the data. The price/dividend ratio is
determined by µ once we set all other parameters.
8Basel III features various capital requirements that banks simultaneously need to satisfy, some of which
feature different risk weights when computing the value of banks’ assets. We see 85% percent as appropriate
given these different requirements.
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Table 3.1: Parametrization
Parameter Description Target
θ = 1 Inverse IES Dividend Elasticity
ψ = 0 Risk aversion Mean market leverage
β = 0.99 Banker’s discount factor Mean dividend rate
µ = 0.98 Investor’s discount factor Price-dividend ratio
r` = 0.015 Loan yield BHC data: interest income / loans
rd = 0.010 Bank debt yield BHC data: interest expense / debt
δ = 0.045 Loan maturity BHC data: average loan maturity
λ¯ = 50 Market leverage constraint BHC data: maximum leverage
φ = 0.85 Risk weight on loans FR-Y-9C instructions
κ = 9 Capital requirement FR-Y-9C instructions
Estimation. To parametrize the c.d.f. for F (ε) we set the support of ε to [ε, 1] and
assume that ln (1− ε) is distributed lognormal with mean 0 and variance σ. We truncate
the support below by ε = 0.9, although for the values of σ we obtain this is numerically
inconsequential.
We estimate two values for the adjustment cost of asset sales γ, one for the pre-crisis level
and one for the post-crisis level: {γpre, γcrisis}. We also estimate two values for the volatility
of default shocks σ, one for the pre-crisis level and one for the post-crisis level: {σpre, σcrisis}.
We use a GMM estimation procedure that uses the market leverage and impulse responses
to return shocks as the data moments. In order to make the estimation computationally
feasible, we resort to an auxiliary model where q is kept fixed at 1. The description of this
auxiliary model, which features just one state variable, can be found in the Appendix. We
show below that the auxiliary model generates similar predictions for the variables that we
use for estimation as the full model. We generate data from the model by simulating the
paths of banks and running the same specification as in Section (2.2).9
We estimate {γpre, γcrisis, σpre, σcrisis} to match three sets of moments from the empirical
section. We target two impulse responses to returns shocks from Section 2.2. We focus on
9We simulate the paths for 10,000 banks for 200 periods for the pre-crisis regime to guarantee that the
cross-sectional distribution of the state variables is stationary. We then keep the same number of quarters
for which we have data before and after the crisis.
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the response to market levarage, for which we use (λ− 1) /s (λ, 1) as the model analogue,
and on liabilites, which in the model equal (λ− 1)W . We also target the mean log market
leverage observed from 1990Q3 to 2006Q4, and in 2009Q1. We then compute the distance
between the coefficients estimated from the model and those from the empirical section,
using as weights a diagonal matrix formed by the inverse of the variances of the estimated
coefficients, as in Christiano et al. 2005. We select the values of {γpre, γcrisis, σpre, σcrisis}
that minimize this distance.
We choose the target moments in order to help the model match Facts 4 and 5. In order
to accomodate Fact 4, we target the empirical response of market leverage to return shocks.
We do the same for the response of liabilities to return shocks in order to account for Fact
5; namely, that the composition of the adjustment of market leverage differs pre- and post-
crisis. In the appendix, we discuss in more detail how the parameters σ and γ are identified
using these moments and the mean market leverage.
Table 3.2: Estimation
Parameter Description Values
γpre Adjustment cost pre-crisis 0.39
γcrisis Adjustment cost post-crisis 0.62
σpre Volatility of default shocks pre-crisis 0.0613
σcrisis Volatility of default shocks post-crisis 0.0665
Results. Figure 3.2 presents the numerical solution to the bank’s problem and the
investor’s valuation using the calibration and estimation above. The figure reports the bank
value V¯ , the stock price s, the dividend rate c, and the loan issuance rate ι. These objects
are normalized to a unit level of W . The plots are functions of λ and q.
It is important to discuss the shape of the value function V¯ . There are regions of the
state space where the bank value and stock price drop to zero. These are the areas in
the liquidation set Γ. A second observation is that the value function is non-monotone in
leverage. The reason is that the value inherits the properties of a static trade-off between
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Figure 3.2: Behavior of Bank Variables as a Function of the State Variables: Leverage and
Market-to-Book Value of Loans
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Note: The figure shows the value function of the bank, the stock value, the optimal dividend
payout and lending rates of banks as functions of the individual bank state variables (λ, q).
risk and return. In this model, the bank cannot control its leverage perfectly because of
the shocks and costs to adjust its leverage. When leverage increases, the bank increases
its immediate return by exploiting the interest spread. However, excessive leverage puts
the bank at risk of of liquidation. A third observation is that as q increases the capital
requirement of the bank tightens the constraint set, and this lowers the bank’s value.
The value of bank shares inherits the shape of the bank’s value function. The only
difference is in scale. The scale and shapes are different because the outside investor values
cash-flows linearly. Importantly, the value of bank shares captures changes in real wealth
that book loans don’t. Thus, return shocks in the model convey information about the future
behavior of the bank, something that rationalizes our identification strategy. The behavior
of loan growth and dividends are determined by the desire to grow leverage and the costs of
delaying dividends.
Portfolio Adjustments Before and After after a Loan Liquidity Crisis. We now
study the impulse response functions (IRFs) to return shocks produced by the auxiliary
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model. We present the impulse responses for {γpre, γcrisis, σpre, σcrisis} keeping all other
parameters constant. Namely, we compare the responses to a 1% negative realization of
R (ε) for the high and low value of γ and σ.
The blue curves in Figure (3.3) are the model-simulated responses, and the black lines are
the empirical estimates from Chapter 2. The top panel reports the IRF of market leverage
and total liabilities pre-crisis, whereas the bottom panel reports the IRF of market leverage
and total liabilities post-crisis. After the shock, the market leverage of the banks jumps
mechanically on impact. Market leverage remains above trend for 2.5 years. The estimated
value of σ helps match the level of market leverage, whereas the γ parameters trade off a
good fit for the response of market leverage versus total liabilities. The model has an almost
perfect fit when only one of these two variables is targeted, and settles for an intermediate
fit of the two when the unrestricted GMM procedure is used.
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Figure 3.3: Model Impulse Responses to a Return Shock
(a) Pre-crisis IRFs
(b) Post-crisis IRFs
Note: The figure shows the impulse response functions of market leverage and liabilities to
return shocks. The blue line corresponds to the model generated IRFs whereas the black
line is from Chapter 2, with the shaded region corresponding to the confidence band for the
estimated responses.
These responses show that this model is capable of replicating the five facts. Fact 1 notes
the divergence of book and market values, and that market values capture information not
captured by the books. The divergence of book and market values is captured by the decline
in q in the model after the shock. By construction, market values contain more information
about the true state of the bank than book values, consistent with Fact 2. Consistent with
Fact 3, banks in the model, are typically not up against the regulatory constraint nor the
market constraint on leverage. However, bank decisions take into account the consequences
of hitting these constraints. Fact 4 is evidence on a leverage target and slow reversion to
that target. The responses produced by the model are consistent with that pattern. Fact
5 notes the difference in the impulse responses pre- and post-crisis. In both the model and
the data, the pre-crisis impulse response shows banks responding to a negative shock by
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reducing their liabilities, with little action on the equity finance margins. Post-crisis, banks
reduce leverage less actively through the use of asset sales.10
In addition to producing the five stylized facts of the data, the model reveals some
additional insights. Within the model, adjustment costs serve as an amplification mechanism
for shocks. The bank not only faces direct losses from defaults, but faces additional losses
due to increased adjustment costs to reach their target leverage. Another insight is that
books are slow to reflect true equity losses; this delay provides an immediate regulatory
slack. An immediate adjustment of books could be very costly. Allowing banks to smooth
out the necessary adjustment over time can limit the consequences of their equity losses and
work as a dampening effect.
Another insight is that the slow adjustment of bank balance sheets is a mechanism for
the persistence of a credit crunch. If banks cannot adjust their leverage immediately, they
will attempt to cutback on the flow of new loans. Thus, a contraction in the credit supply
will persist until banks return to their target leverage.
Although we have not incorporated general equilibrium effects into the model, we can
anticipate there could be contagion. Forced asset sales by one bank can lower the price of
loans for other banks.
3.3 Conclusion
We present a heterogeneous-bank model that distinguishes book from market values. In
our model, both measures of equity matter for banking decisions. A novel feature is that
banks have the ability to delay the acknowledgement of loan losses on their books. The
model produces an endogenous target for leverage and features adjustment costs to the
resale of assets. The model reproduces the impulse responses that we estimated from the
cross-sectional data. When we interpret the crisis as a period of greater adjustment costs
10In the data we also examined the breakdown between raising equity through new issuances vs. through
lower dividends (retained earnings). In the model, we abstract from this distinction for simplicity.
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and larger realization of the default shock, the model is able to reproduce the shift in the
method of adjustment of market equity that we see in the data.
The model has many reduced-form assumptions and is studied in partial equilibrium.
However, it highlights the essential theoretical features that are necessary to reproduce the
five empirical facts. Our hope is that we can use this model to search for the microfounda-
tions that can deliver similar reduced form dynamics and, therefore, can also reproduce the
empirical facts.
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3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Preliminary Definitions. Define the net investment rate of the bank as:
ι ≡ I/`.
and express the dividend-to-equity ratio as:
c ≡ div/W.
Note the following identities:
` = λW
d = (λ− 1)W
¯`= q−1λW.
We present some observations that aid the proof of the proposition.
Observation 1: homogeneity of p. Observe that:
p (I, `, d) = 1 + γ
I
`
`
`− d
= 1 + γ
I
`
`
W
= 1 + γιλ.
Thus, we can express p (I, `, d) as:
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p¯ (ι, λ) = 1 + γιλ,
which is a function independent of the size of the bank, and only depends on the composition
of its assets and its investment rate.
Observation 2: homogeneity of regulatory constraint. We want to express the
capital requirement in terms of the end-of-period choices (λ′, q′). First, notice that we can
express the regulatory constraint as:
d′ ≤ κ
1 + κ
φ¯`′.
Let ρ ≡ φκ/ (1 + κ). Then, this constraint is equivalent to:
d′
W ′
≤ ρ
¯`′
`′
`′
W ′
Using the definitions of λ and q:
λ′ − 1 ≤ ρ
q′
λ′
and rearranging:
λ′ ≤ 1
1− ρ
q′
which is operational for q′ ≥ ρ. Note that the constraint is independent of W .
Observation 3: growth independence. Next, we denote by W ′ (ε) the bank’s equity
at the beginning of period t + 1, as a function of the realization of the default shock, and
express it as a linear function of wealth:
W ′ (ε) = ε`′ − d′
= ε ((1− δ) `+ I)− ((1 + rd) d− (δ + r`) `+ p (I, `, d) I + div)
=
(
ε (1− δ) + δ + r`) `− (1 + rd) d− div + (ε− p¯ (ι, λ)) I
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Now, we factor W from the expression above to obtain:
W ′ (ε) =
[(
ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c+ (ε− p¯ (ι, λ)) ιλ]W
= Ω (ε)W.
Here, we implicitly defined the return on equity as:
Ω (ε) ≡ (ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c+ (ε− p¯ (ι, λ)) ιλ.
Substituting in the price of deposits:
Ω (ε) ≡ (ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− (1− ε) ιλ− γ (ιλ)2 .
Observation 4: recursive leverage. Next, from the law of motion of ` we obtain a
recursive expression for the the law of motion of leverage λ given any choice of ι and c :
λ′ =
`′
W ′
=
(1− δ + ι) `
W ′
= (1− δ + ι)λW
W ′
.
But note that W ′ = W ′ (1) = Ω (1)W. Therefore:
λ′ =
1− δ + ι
Ω (1)
λ.
Similarly, the value of λ at the beginning of period t+1 after the realization of the default
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shock is:
λ′ (ε) =
ε`′
W ′ (ε)
=
ε (1− δ + ι) `
W ′ (ε)
= (1− δ + ι)λ εW
W ′ (ε)
=
εΩ (1)
Ω (ε)
λ′
=
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε)
To derive the last equality we use the fact that, from the law of motion for λ′ and the
definition for Ω (ε):
(
1 + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− γ (ιλ)2 = Ω (1) = 1− δ + ι
λ′
λ
⇒ c = (1 + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− γ (ιλ)2 − (1− δ + ι) λ
λ′
and substituting this expression in Ω (ε):
Ω (1)
Ω (ε)
ελ′ =
(1− δ + ι) λ
λ′
(ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− (1− ε) ιλ− γ (ιλ)2 ελ
′
=
(1− δ + ι) λ
λ′
(ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + r`)λ+ (1− δ + ι) λ
λ′ − (1− ε) ιλ
ελ′
=
(1− δ + ι)λ
(ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + r`)λ+ (1− δ + ι) λ
λ′ − (1− ε) ιλ
ε
=
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε)
Observation 5: recursive expression for q. Next, we show how to write q in a
recursive way:
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q′ =
`′
¯`′ =
(1− δ) `+ I
(1− δ) ¯`+ I =
((1− δ)λ+ ιλ)W(
(1− δ) λ
q
+ ιλ
)
W
=
1− δ + ι
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
.
The value of q at the beginning of period t+ 1 after the realization of the default shock
is simply q′ (ε) = εq′.
Observation 6: default set. The regulatory constraint can be re-expressed as:
1− ρ
q′
≤ 1
λ′
.
From here, we employ the laws of motion for λ′ and q′ to obtain:
1− ρ
1−δ+ι
(1−δ) 1
q
+ι
≤ Ω (1)
(1− δ + ι)λ
1− Ω (1)
(1− δ + ι)λ ≤
ρ
(
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
)
1− δ + ι
1−
(
1 + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− (1− p¯ (ι, λ)) ιλ
(1− δ + ι)λ ≤
ρ
(
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
)
1− δ + ι(
ι− δ − r`)λ+ (1 + rd) (λ− 1) + c+ (1− p¯ (ι, λ)) ιλ ≤ ρ((1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
)
λ
Substituting for p¯ and re-arranging we obtain:
(1− ρ) ιλ+ γ (ιλ)2 + c ≤
(
ρ (1− δ) 1
q
+ δ + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1) .
So long as ρ < 1, the constraint set is convex, for any (λ, q) . Note again that the constraint
is independent of W . Default occurs whenever there are no possible choices of (c, ι) such
that this inequality can be satisfied. Note that the left hand side is minimized for c = 0 and
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ι = − (1− ρ) /2γλ. Evaluating the left hand side at the minimizers, default occurs if (λ, q)
belong to the region where the minimized left hand side is larger than the right hand side:
−(1− ρ)
2
4γ
>
(
ρ (1− δ) 1
q
+ δ + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)
or:
(1− ρ)2 + 4γ
[(
ρ (1− δ) 1
q
+ δ + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)] < 0
The default set Γm is simply the values of ` and d such that `/ (`− d) = λ > λ¯.
Observation 7: homogeneity of the value function. We guess and verify that:
V
(
b, l, b¯
)
= V¯ (λ, q)W 1−θ
for Epstein-Zin preferences with IES 1/θ. Next, we work with our guess for the value function:
V¯ (λ, q)W 1−θ = max
{div,I}
U
(
div
W
)
W 1−θ + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V
(
ε`′, d′, ¯`′
))])
subject to:
`′ = (1− δ) `+ I
¯`′ = (1− δ) ¯`+ I
d′ =
(
1 + rd
)
d− (δ + r`) `+ p (I, `, d) I + div
d′ ≤ κ (φ¯`′ − d′) .
First, we transform the constraint set. We use the law of motion for wealth to express
every equation in terms of past wealth and current decisions:
W ′ (ε) = Ω (ε)W.
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Then, observations 4 and 5 imply that once we know λ′ and q′ and W ′, we know
{
`′, ¯`′, d′
}
and the first equations are satisfied.
Second, we divide both sides of the regulatory constraint, again to obtain:
(1− ρ) ιλ+ γ (ιλ)2 + c ≤
(
ρ (1− δ) 1
q
+ δ + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1) .
If the conjecture is right, we can replace the law of motion into the objective and obtain:
V¯ (λ, q)W 1−θ = max
{c,ι}
U (c)W 1−θ + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε) , εq
′
)
Ω (ε)1−θ
)])
W 1−θ.
This shows that the objective is indeed homothetic in wealth. Hence, we have to solve
the following:
V¯ (λ, q) = max
{c,ι}
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε) , εq
′
)
Ω (ε)1−θ
)])
subject to the conditions we described above:
(a) Law of motion for leverage:
λ′ =
(1− δ + ι)λ
Ω (1)
.
(b) Law of motion for books:
q′ =
1− δ + ι
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
.
(c) Loan price:
p¯ (ι, λ) = 1 + γιλ
(d) Return on equity:
Ω (ε) =
(
ε (1− δ) + δ + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− (1− ε) ιλ− γ (ιλ)2 .
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(e) Regulatory constraint:
1
λ′
≥ 1− ρ
q′
for q′ ≥ ρ
This verifies the proposition.
3.4.2 Computational Algorithm
To solve numerically the problem of the bank we re-write it in terms of the control variables
λ′ and q′. To solve for c and ι in terms of λ′ and q′, first note that the law of motion for q
implies:
q′ =
1− δ + ι
(1− δ) 1
q
+ ι
⇒ ι = − (1− δ) 1−
q′
q
1− q′
and, using the definition of Ω (1), the law of motion for λ implies:
λ′ =
1− δ + ι
(1 + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− c− γ (ιλ)2λ
⇒ c = (1 + r`)λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− γ (ιλ)2 − (1− δ + ι) λ
λ′
.
Another useful observation is that, with this expression for c, the return on equity can
be expressed as:
Ω (ε) = (1− δ + ι)λ
(
1
λ′
− (1− ε)
)
.
This rearrangement is useful because the first part, (1− δ + ι)λ, is independent of ε, and
can therefore be factored out of the continuation value in the Bellman equation:
U
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε) , εq
′
)
Ω (ε)1−θ
)])
= ...
((1− δ + ι)λ)1−θ U
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε) , εq
′
)(
1
λ′
− (1− ε)
)1−θ)])
The second term in the continuation value, U
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V¯
(
ε
1/λ′−(1−ε) , εq
′
) (
1
λ′ − (1− ε)
)1−θ)])
,
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does not depend on the state variables (λ, q), and hence only needs to be computed once per
iteration (as opposed to once for every point in the state space).
The main computational challenge to solve the model is that we need to construct a
mapping between the grids for λ′ and q′ and the values of λ and q at the beginning of period
t + 1, ε
1/λ′−(1−ε) and εq
′, which need to belong to the grids for λ and q. However, because
of the factorization of the continuation value we just did, this mapping only needs to be
computed once at the beginning of the algorithm.
To reduce the numerical error generated by the discrepancies between ε
1/λ′−(1−ε) and the
value assigned in the grid for λ, and between εq′ and the value assigned in the grid for q,
the mapping we use assigns the two closest values in the state space, with proportions given
by 1 minus the size of the discrepancy. For instance, if ε
1/λ′−(1−ε) = 5.4 and the two closest
values in the grid for λ are 5.2 and 5.7, then we weight the continuation value with λ = 5.2
by 1− 0.2/0.5 and the continuation value with λ = 5.7 by 1− 0.3/0.5.
We solve the model using value function i
Ω (ε) = (1− δ + ι)λ
(
1
λ′
− (1− ε)
)
teration over a discretized state space of 2000 nodes for λ and 500 nodes for q. The control
variables λ′ and q′ are also discretized over 2000 and 500 nodes, respectively. The exogenous
state variable ε is discretized over 1000 nodes.
Given the parameters and prices (i.e. the interest rates on loans and deposits), the bank
solves its optimization problem. The following computational algorithm solves the bank’s
problem by updating the value function of the bank until a fixed point is reached.
1. Use the value function from the last iteration (or a guess if it is the first).
2. For each value of the state variables, check whether the constraints are not violated.
3. Conditional on a given endogenous state variable combination
(a) for each possible value of the control variables (λ′, q′)
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i. Update the values of the variables (c, ι) as well as (1− δ + ι)λ.
ii. Compute the new value function, using the Bellman equation.
(b) Find the value of the control variables (λ′, q′) that maximizes the value function
for a given state variable combination.
4. The resulting updated value function is compared to the initial value function. Until
convergence is reached, repeat steps 1 to 4.
3.4.3 Auxiliary Model
In order to estimate the adjustment costs and volatility of default shocks pre- and post-crisis,
we use a simplified version of the model that keeps the value of the Tobin q for loans fixed
at q = 1. Note that for q = 1 the optimal choice is q′ = 1. We abstract from ε shocks to q
for this simplified case, so the state q = 1 becomes absorbent. The problem of the bank is:
V aux (λ) = max
{λ′,ι}
U (c) + βU
(
CEt
[
U−1
(
V aux
(
ε
1/λ′ − (1− ε)
)
Ω (ε)1−θ
)])
subject to:
c =
(
1 + r`
)
λ− (1 + rd) (λ− 1)− γ (ιλ)2 − (1− δ + ι) λ
λ′
Ω (ε) = (1− δ + ι)λ
(
1
λ′
− (1− ε)
)
λ′ ≤ 1
1− ρ
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